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Abstract
This thesis attempts to provide end to end encryption within the fixed 
infrastructure of Home Public Land Mobile Network (Home PLMN) and link 
by link encryption within the GSM PLMN. A new proposal for an authenti­
cation protocol for inter PLMN identity and technique for key distribution, 
achieves end to end encryption and link by link encryption across the GSM 
network. As a consequence of this, the GSM mobile phone user’s voice can 
be completely protected from one point of communication to the other com­
munication point. The receiving end may be within the same home mobile 
network or may be in a different network but within the GSM service area. 
We also propose a formal authentication protocol to set up inter PLMN calls, 
which solves the Border problem, as without the permission or awareness of 
the Home PLMN, no one can send any encrypted message. However it does 
provide complete encryption between different mobile networks within the 
GSM service area. Our proposal attempts to secure the location update be­
tween two Visitor Location Register (VLR) locations of a Home PLMN and 
also to secure international location update between inter PLMN of GSM 
PLMN, by encrypting important subscriber data being transferred between 
them.
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Chapter 1
Introduction, Aim and Scope
1.1 Introduction
Mobile communications have been known to be vulnerable to interception 
and unauthorized access. In recent years, both public and private sectors 
extensively rely upon mobile communication networks for communicating 
sensitive technical, financial, military, political, economic, and personal in­
formation [13]. Securing this information and its transmission as well as 
the access to the mobile network is a necessity for the secure and smooth 
operation of the system.
The concept of cellular mobile communication evolved in early eighties, 
before that radio phones with one transmitter were used to cover the large 
area. The first generation of cellular mobile communication systems used 
analog cellular phones. The security features provided in the analog phones 
is voice scrambling.
In analog scrambling, the original speech signal x (t ) is directly scrambled
8
s
Figure 1.1: The Analog Scrambling Concept, 
into a different analog wave form y(t) by some scrambling algorithm K s:
y(t) = Ks(x(t))
y(t) is the scrambled output of speech, which is to be transmitted through 
an analog transmission system [19]. This is illustrated in Fig 1.1. Unfortu­
nately, scrambling cannot offer a high degree of security. The protection it 
offers is just to avoid non professional eavesdroppers from eavesdropping it.
The second generation cellular mobile communication systems like GSM 
differ significantly from the earlier first generation system in a number of 
ways. They are digital, provide inter system (network) roaming and have 
integrated security features like digital encryption and authentication with 
the special active role played by smart cards [21].
The security requirements and services of a digital cellular mobile com­
munication system differ extensively from those of a fixed network due to the 
radio communication between the user and the base station (local transmit- 
ter/receiver). There is no physical link in the form of a (fixed) telephone line
9
between the user and the local exchange, which could serve to identify the 
user for routing and charging purposes. A user’s identity has to be verified 
over an air interface. Authentication by means of cryptographic procedure 
is thus required to stop an impostor from impersonating someone else, and 
transferring calls and charges. Eavesdropping on the radio path and inter­
cepting a conversation or tracing the whereabouts of a user by listening to 
signalling data are other serious threats.
GSM is an abbreviation for Global System for Mobile communication. 
It is a European standard for digital, cellular mobile communication system 
involving, at present 17 European countries and Australia as the first non 
European country [9]. The aim and scope of this project are based on GSM 
security system.
1.2 Aim
The main aim of this thesis is to provide a secure GSM mobile network by 
providing security features like identity authentication of GSM networks, sub­
scriber information confidentiality, complete digital voice encryption across 
the radio interface and fixed infrastructure of the GSM network. The ideas 
it proposes for GSM security are basically solutions to certain other parts 
which are not considered in the existing GSM security system.
1.3 Scope
The scope of this thesis presents the background of communication and se­
curity aspects of GSM. Then it discusses the problems and security threats 
in the cellular mobile communications, including the security flaws in the
10
existing security system for GSM and certain other insecurities which are 
not considered in the existing security system. Finally it arrives with the 
solutions for these problems detected, by proposing digital encryption using 
DES, identity authentication protocol for inter networks and key distribution 
protocol for complete encryption of the voice across the network.
In chapter 2, it discusses the basics of Cellular Mobile Communications 
such as the cell, mobile network components, existing GSM security sys­
tem, and other second generation mobile communications and their security 
features.
In chapter 3, it discusses the security threats of cellular mobile commu­
nications with certain examples like how voice data may eavesdrop at the 
radio interface and how incoming and outgoing calls for mobile phones are 
monitored. And also it explains the security loopholes in the GSM system 
of mobile communication such as voice is not encrypted in the network side, 
important parameters like triplets and IMSI are transmitted unenciphered 
in the network side.
In chapter 4, it discusses about DES encryption scheme to solve the eaves­
dropping problem discussed in the chapter 2. it explains the basic operation 
and basic function of these algorithm and finally how DES in output feedback 
mode and cipher feedback mode are employed in this project and where it is 
stored in mobile network and mobile station.
In chapter 5, it discusses a key distribution protocol for establishing com­
plete encryption of voice data across the network. Besides, it discusses the 
key managements such as, private key allocations for inter mobile networks 
and private key allocations for components within one mobile network. This 
is a proposed idea for this project.
In chapter 6, it explains about the proposed authentication protocol for
11
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identity of networks during international mobile calls and international lo­
cation update. This is also one of the proposed idea for this project. This 
authentication protocol is encrypted using the DES algorithm which is ex­
plained in the 4th chapter. During international mobile calls, the proposed 
authentication protocol helps in carrying session key as a result of key dis­
tribution protocol discussed in chapter 5. As a result of this, it shows how 
certain problems discussed in chapter 3 are solved.
In chapter 7, it discusses how a smart card is employed in the proposed se­
curity system for GSM and how cryptographic mobile communication takes 
place with the help of link by link encryption and end to end encryption, 
which can be carried out using the DES encryption algorithm, Key distribu­
tion protocol and authentication protocol are explained in chapters 5 ,6 , and 
7 respectively. This encryption employment across the fixed infrastructure 
of GSM network is a proposed idea for this project.
Finally in the chapter 8, we conclude by discussing the solutions given by 
the proposed security system for GSM and discuss further research work.
A paper based on this thesis co-authored by D.Chenthurvasan and Dr. 
Yuliang Zheng has been accepted and will appear in the proceedings of “Fifth 
Australian International Conference on Speech Science and Technology (SST- 
94)” conference to be held at Perth, Western Australia, December 6 - 8, 1994.
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Chapter 2
Basics of Cellular Mobile 
Communications
This chapter gives a brief introduction to cellular radio concepts such as 
the basic cell structure, certain terminologies used in mobile communication 
networks, components of mobile communication network. It also describes 
communications of cellular mobile phones using GSM mobile network.
2.1 Cellular Concepts
In cellular mobile communication, the land is divided into small areas of 
sizes ranging between 100m to 35km, and each small area equipped with 
a transmitter/receiver (transceiver) of radio frequency signals, is known as 
the cell. The transmitter/receiver in each cell is connected to the switching 
centers and other components to route the calls, forms the cellular mobile 
network. Ultimately with the help of cellular mobile communication network, 
the cellular mobile phone user is allowed to move from one cell to another
13
cell and make a call to the mobile phone user in another cell or another user 
of fixed telephone network. During the movement of mobile phone from one 
cell to another cell, the mobile network stores the latest location i.e latest 
cell position to route the incoming calls.
2.2 Fixed, Cordless and Cellular Phones
In fixed telephones, each telephone is physically connected to the local ex­
change. The local exchange is connected to a fixed telephone network. So the 
dialed number could be referred to the fixed location through the local ex­
change. A cordless telephone contains two units, a fixed unit and a movable 
unit. The fixed unit is physically connected to the fixed telephone network 
and the movable unit can be moved within certain range of diameter, to 
receive and make a call. The fixed part acts as a local transceiver of calls 
to/from  the movable part, and the call is transmitted across the air interface 
provided between them. In the cordless telephone system, the dialed number 
is always referred to the fixed part of cordless telephone even if the movable 
part is within the range or not. Hence, in both cordless telephone and fixed 
telephone, finding a subscriber’s location is easy.
In the case of cellular mobile communications, mobility is allowed between 
cell to cell. So the dialed number could be any where, and is not related to the 
local transceiver’s location or one particular area [1,2,8]. In this case, before 
the call is given or the call is made, the latest position will be identified 
by the network in a constant interval of time. This is called monitoring of 
cellular mobile phones by the mobile network.
14
2.3 Digital Cellular Communication Princi­
ples
This section explains the basics of communication principles like signals, 
analog to digital conversion, digital to analog conversion, modulation and 
demodulation, and data transmission and multiplexing used in the cellular 
mobile communications.
2.3.1 Conversion of Voice into Digital Signal
The microphone in the mobile transmitter/receiver unit converts voice into 
analog signal. The analog signal is sampled, quantized and encoded into 
digital signals by using pulse code modulation (PCM) [1,2,3]. The quanti­
zation and the encoding combined together are called as analog to digital 
conversion. The digital signal is enciphered by using an encryption algo­
rithm which is stored in the mobile equipment. This enciphered digital data 
is converted into transmittable digital data with the help of frequency shift 
keying (FSK) method [1], and transmitted into the air interface to reach the 
local transceiver (local transmitter/receiver).
2.3.2 Transmission of Digital Signal
The generated digital signal from analog speech is organised in a special way 
before enciphering, modulating and transmitting across the air interface. A 
special operating system called Time Division Multiple Access (TDM A) is 
employed for organising and allocating a timeslot for digital data in a par­
ticular radio frequency channel. In TDMA, each Radio frequency channel is 
divided into timeslot of approximately 577micro sec duration. These times­
15
lots are grouped together in sets of eight consecutive timeslots as one TDMA 
frame. These frames are then grouped together in one of two ways as multi­
frames [15].
1: A 26 frame multiframes comprising of 26 TDMA frames. This mul­
tiframe is used to carry traffic channels and their associated control 
channels.
2: A 51 frame multiframe comprising of 51 TDMA frames. This multi­
frame is used exclusively for control channels.
Each radio frequency channel is logically divided into eight physical chan­
nels in GSM type of TDMA. Out of these eight physical channels, one channel 
is called traffic channel and rest of the channels are called control channels. 
The traffic channel is used to carry speech data and its associated control sig­
nals. So this 26 frame multiframe undergoes speech coding, channel coding, 
and interleaving finally made into blocks of 114 bits. This bits can be en­
crypted, modulated and sent it to the allocated radio frequency by the mobile 
station. The speech coding, channel coding and interleaving are explained in
[15]-
2.4 Cellular Radio
In the cellular concept, many transmitters are used to cover the large area. 
Each transmitter has limited power output of radio frequency signal, so the 
coverage of one transmitter is restricted to a small area known as a cell. The 
average radio frequency of operation of the transmitter is 900MHz [8].
When a person using a mobile phone in one cell moves out of the range 
of that cell, the call can be transferred to the next cell automatically without
16
FI = Frequency 1 
F2 = Frequency 2 
F3 = Frequency 3 
F4 = Frequency 4
Figure 2.1: The Cell Structure.
any break in the conversation and requires no special intervention by the user. 
Since the limiting power output of transmitter in a cell, the interference of 
one cell, on the others around it is reduced. This allows the non - adjacent 
cells to use the same frequency many times. The cell structure and frequency 
reuse is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.5 Mobile Network Components
The mobile network components are the basic building blocks of the GSM 
mobile network (GSM PLMN). The GSM PLMN can be functionally classi­
fied into three layers of mobile network components. The lower level of land 
mobile network component is called the Base Station System (BSS). BSS is 
the radio sub system which provides radio coverage of a GSM mobile network 
to enable user calls [8].
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Since mobility is allowed in the cellular radio concept. The new cell must 
be obtained and call should be handed over when the subscriber moves from 
one cell to another cell. This is governed by the second layer of the mobile 
network known as the Mobile Service Switching Center (MSC).
Finally, to monitor the status of mobile station as they travel across 
the PLMN, the network needs central storage and local storage to store 
the information on mobile station. The local storage associated with the 
MSC stores temporary information on mobile station for access. The central 
storage is done using Home Location Register, which serve as the third layer 
of the mobile network component. The functional description of each mobile 
network component is explained in the following sections.
2.5.1 Base Station System (BSS)
The main purpose of the Base Station (BSS) is to manage all aspects of radio 
frequency links between the mobile station and the fixed infrastructure of a 
mobile network. It allocates the channel to the mobile station for the use 
of calls. It also monitors the radio frequency link between mobile station 
and the mobile network and releases the channel when the call is over [8]. 
The releasing function could be done in conjunction with the MSC, either 
because the call might have ended or the call might be handed over to the 
next cell to continue.
In the case of a hand over, the local information is provided regularly by 
the mobile station to the PLMN, BSS in particular, during the call. From this 
information, the BSS measures and produces the list of suitable cells. This 
list is then sent to the MSC, to determine the cell the call could successfully 
be handed over. Normally, the first cell in the list will be selected. Once 
the cell is selected to hand over the call, the MSC will determine when it is
18
Figure 2.2: The Base Station System Configuration.
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appropriate for the mobile station to be handed over.
The BSS also carries out the encryption in the air interface between the 
mobile station and the PLMN Network. It ensures that the cells are running 
efficiently and configures the radio channel in respect of their use as traffic 
channels or signalling channels.
The BSS is functionally classified into three parts, first part is Base Sta­
tion Controller (BSC), second part is Base Transmitter Station (BTS) and 
third part is the Transcoder, is normally associated with the BSC. The BSS 
configuration is shown in the Figure 2.2
The BSC controls the trans/receiver units within BSS. It can control 
one or more cells. The BTS constitutes the physical equipment required to 
communicate with the mobile station. The Transcoder is used to change 
GSM speech data into fixed network speech data, for transmission over fixed 
lines [8].
2.5.2 Mobile Service Switching Center (MSC)
The Mobile Service Switching Center acts as an interface between the radio 
part and fixed part of the GSM PLMN network. In the fixed telephone 
network, the dialed number is always referred and attached to the fixed 
location. Once the call set up is over, it switches themselves to the correct 
destination.
In the case of GSM mobile communications, the dialed number could be 
any where in the cells. To accomplish this, each MSC has several BSS under 
its control and inturn each cell has one BSS with it. Within the area of the 
cells, MSC switches for incoming and outgoing calls for a mobile station. 
Besides this, the MSC has to monitor radio resources and dictating, when
20
Figure 2.3: The MSC Configuration.
and where hand overs are to occur. The MSC configuration is shown in 
Figure 2.3
The MSC also register and update the information in the central storage 
entities i.e Home Location Register (HLR). Since, there is no guarantee that 
the mobile station will remain in one place, its location is always kept in a 
central storage entity. In order to switch the call, the MSC gets the location 
from the central storage and routes the call to the mobile station.
In some cases the MSC acts as a gateway MSC that is, the MSC with the 
provision for external link to the another network. The external link may 
be, to some other mobile network of GSM PLMN or to any other fixed line 
telephone network. In the latter case, it is connected to the public switch 
telephone network. The Gateway MSC configuration is shown in Figure 2.4.
21
Figure 2.4: The Gateway MSC Configuration.
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2.5.3 Visitor Location Register (VLR)
The visitor Location Register is a database that stores general information 
about each mobile station within the MSC area served by that VLR. Gener­
ally, each MSC is associated with one VLR. Moreover the number of mobile 
station stored will dictate whether a VLR serves just one or several MSCs.
The information stored in the VLR consists of the mobile station identity, 
location area identity, where the mobile station was last registered( i.e which 
cell), and some other data associated with the subscription and supplemen­
tary services. Whenever a mobile station makes a call, the MSC refer to the 
VLR and checks whether the call is permitted for a particular subscription 
or not. This is not done for outgoing calls. For incoming calls, the VLR 
mainly controls the paging of the mobile station. The VLR configuration is 
shown in Figure 2.5
2.5.4 Home Location Register (HLR)
The Home Location Register is the central database for all subscriber to the 
Home country’s Mobile Network [8]. In the case of visiting mobile station 
from another network, it stores newly visited mobile station’s details as long 
as it stays in the visiting network. For all incoming calls, the HLR is referred 
because it holds all the necessary information like what services each sub­
scriber is entitled to use on the PLMN, where a subscriber is located or last 
registered, and the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) which is 
a unique number which identifies each subscriber on a PLMN and is only 
used within the GSM PLMN. All information transfer involving the sub­
scriber is done using the IMSI, and the mobile station international number 
(ISDN) is the phone number of a mobile station. Through this database, all
23
Figure 2.5: The GSM Network Configuration.
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administrative procedures are carried out by the network operator.
All changes in the location of a mobile station are updated in the Home 
Location Register (HLR) by the Visitor Location Register (VLR). Thus HLR 
gets the latest registered location. The HLR configuration is shown in Fig­
ure 2.5
2.5.5 Authentication center (AUC)
The authentication center is an entity used in the GSM to perform authen­
tication tests and ensure that mobile stations are who they claim to be. A 
special calculation function is performed between AUC and the SIM, which 
is only known to the AUC and the SIM of the mobile station, to carry 
out the authentication process. The AUC is situated closer to the HLR in 
the GSM mobile network. The authentication center associated with the 
home location register (AUC/HLR) performs many cryptographic activities 
like encryption/decryption key generation for voice data, managing keys and 
executing the cryptographic algorithm. All the cryptographic activities are 
carried out in AUC, but the governing is done by the HLR. The AUC configu­
ration is shown in Figure 2.5. In the proposed security system, the AUC/HLR 
governs all the cryptographic protocol for securing the mobile network.
2.6 Security System in Current GSM
In the present Global System of Mobile Communications (GSM), the security 
system provides three different security features related to the user point of 
view [9].
(1) Temporary identities for the confidentiality of the subscriber identity.
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(2) Authentication for the verification of the identity of the user.
(3) Enciphering for the confidentiality of user voice data at the air interface.
The following sections explain the above mentioned points.
2.6.1 Temporary Identities
Each and every subscriber of the global system for mobile communications 
(GSM) network possesses a unique international mobile subscriber identity 
(IMSI), which is nothing but the mobile station’s service number to the GSM 
mobile network (GSM PLMN). Using this unique number one can easily 
find, the mobile network to which the subscriber belongs to. This number 
should not be exposed across the network, otherwise intercepting this number 
would lead easy monitoring of mobile calls for that particular subscription. 
So within the network and radio link between mobile station and the base 
station (BSS), instead of using IMSI, temporary mobile subscriber identity 
(TMSI) will be given to each and every subscriber by the Public land mobile 
network (PLMN) and used within the network. But the TMSI is stored and 
accessed in conjunction with the Location Area Identity (LAI). The LAI is 
also provided by the PLMN along with the TMSI to the mobile station in 
the smart card. The LAI is generally broadcast from the local BSS. This 
gives the local information like area identity. But mobile station simply 
cannot store this LAI from the BSS. Once the mobile station finds that the 
LAI stored in it is different from the LAI being broadcast from current BSS 
location, it asks for a location update to the PLMN in that case, it sends only 
previous LAI and TMSI stored in it. Using this TMSI, the Visitor Location 
Register (VLR) of a PLMN can identify where it was last registered and 
contacts the corresponding VLR and asks for the IMSI. Once the VLR gets
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IMSI of newly entered mobile station, it assigns a new TMSI and LAI to 
that particular mobile station which asked for a location update. The TMSI 
will be different for different VLR area. Because TMSI is being used in the 
network side, instead of IMSI, it provides confidentiality of the user identity.
2.6.2 Authentication
The authentication protocol checks whether a subscriber is the one who he 
claims to be. The main purpose of authentication process is to prevent 
unauthorised access of network by an attacker and to ensure the correct 
billing for the genuine subscriber [13]. This process is explained bellow.
Authentication Center’s (AU C) Roles
The authentication process takes place between the Visitor Location Register 
(VLR) and the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). But the parameters for 
authenticating a subscriber can only be supplied by the AUC/HLR in the 
Home Public Land Mobile Network (Home PLMN). In this case each network 
can use their own authentication algorithm to authenticate their subscriber 
any where in the GSM PLMN.
In the AUC/HLR and the SIM, a special authentication algorithm called 
the A3 algorithm and a special A8 algorithm for generating the ciphering 
key K c are used, which are stored in a physically safe place. Each valid 
subscriber has a unique secret key called Ki which is stored both in the 
AUC/HLR and the SIM. When the authentication request comes from the 
VLR to the AUC/HLR. The AUC Picks a random number (RAND) and 
the Ki for that particular user and inputs into A3 algorithm and gets the 
response (SRES). And again it inputs the same Ki and RAND into the A8
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Figure 2.6: Authentication Process (Symmetric technique)
algorithm and gets the ciphering key A"c, and sends it as a triplet [RAND, 
SRES, K c] to the VLR.
Authentication Process
The VLR initiates the authentication process by sending a RAND to the 
mobile station (MS). Upon receiving the RAND, the MS puts the RAND 
into the A3 algorithm stored in it and gets the response SRES, which is then 
sent to the VLR. There VLR checks the authenticity by comparing the SRES 
with the one it has got already. If these two are matching, then VLR confirms 
that it is the valid subscriber. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.6
2.6.3 Enciphering
The actual enciphering process is carried out between the Base Station (BSS) 
and the mobile station (MS). The enciphering algorithm is called A5 algo­
rithm, which is stored in both the mobile equipment (ME) i.e mobile station 
(MS) without the SIM and the BSS in the PLMN side. The purpose of 
enciphering process is to provide confidentiality of user data.
Once the authenticity is verified, the ciphering Kc is given to the BSS
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Figure 2.7: Enciphering Process
by the VLR. In the mobile station side, Kc can be derived by inputting 
RAND and A z- to the A8 algorithm. The same A5 algorithm is used in all 
mobile equipment (ME) throughout the service area of the (GSM). The A5 
algorithm is like modulo 2 addition of plaintexts and the ciphertext. After 
BSS gets the /Fc, it sends the start ciphering message to the mobile station 
and then it starts enciphering/deciphering at its end. It does not expect any 
reply from the mobile station, all it expects is that the mobile station should 
starts enciphering/deciphering at its end. The ciphering process is illustrated 
in Figure 2.7
Reusing the Previous Kc
The other option regarding the enciphering key Kc is reusing the previous 
K c for enciphering user data. The Kc is always stored. In this case only both 
ends should confirm that they have a common key. This can be achieved by 
using the cipher key sequence number. This cipher key sequence number is 
incremented every time the A8 algorithm runs. This process occurs at both 
ends i.e, in network side as well as the mobile station side. But it can be
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incremented only up to four value after that it starts from zero. So the cipher 
key sequence number is sent across the air and compared to ensure that the 
K c is the same at both ends.
2.7 Other Technologies and Their Security 
Features
The new planned digital Cordless telecommunication system (DECT) is a 
European second generation Cordless telephone system. It is digital and 
provides inter system roaming like GSM. Also, it has security features similar 
to GSM. It has a portable termination (PT) using which one can talk, and 
fixed radio termination (FT) which enables the services [21].
Similar to the GSM, DECT also performs authentication of portable unit 
by the fixed unit for every call attempts. A special security feature provided 
in DECT over GSM, is authentication of the network by the mobile station. 
This is quite an important feature of the DECT system. It is required due to 
the different environment a DECT portable part (PT) is used. The authen­
tication of network by the mobile station prevents the possibility to change 
subscription data, and even prevents blocking of a subscription over the air 
interface.
Another new digital technology, TRW teams with PacTel cellular, Cal­
ifornia, USA, has introduced a breakthrough technology to block cellular 
fraud. The system is designed to stop fraudulent access to cellular networks 
across the USA by persons using stolen telephone access numbers [27].
As a fraudulent access by intercepting caller’s telephone frequency and 
then reading the access code and telephone number, cellular “counterfeiters”
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can illegally install duplicate numbers in tampered phone ( a process known 
as “cloning” ) and steal cellular services.
As a breakthrough, the new TRW system determines the legitimacy of 
a call by comparing the unique signal frequency patterns, or fingerprint of 
the phone making the call with the signal frequency pattern does not match 
the one file for a telephone number, in these case TRW phoneprintTM will 
terminate the call before the system is accessed.
The system works by making an electronic print based on the unique 
signal transmission characteristics of each cellular phone. Because each phone 
has a unique print - an electronic version of a human fingerprint - it cannot 
be duplicated. Once the real print is recorded, detection of a counterfeit 
print can be made. TRW phoneprintTM is able to provide real time analysis 
of each print every time a call is made and can block access within seconds 
of a counterfeit call be being detected.
TRW  phoneprintTM is currently being tested by PacTel cellular and test­
ing is expected to complete in early 1994.
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Chapter 3
Security Flaws in GSM
This chapter discusses various security threats and loopholes in the existing 
GSM. Unlike fixed telephone, cellular mobile phones communicate through 
the air interface. This air interface is highly vulnerable to both active and 
passive attacks like interception, interference and illegitimate access.
Basically the attacks are classified into two categories, interception of 
data on the air interface and illegitimate access to mobile services [9]. This 
is mostly likely to happen in between the mobile station and the base sta­
tion. Even in the fixed infrastructure of a mobile network, when the com­
munications takesplace through microwave and satellite sources, in the case 
of fixed line, any active attacker can intercept the insecure line and tap the 
information flowing between the two communicating points of the mobile 
network component. In the case of microwave, any active attacker with the 
sophisticated microwave receiver just near the same line can intercept the in­
formation flowing between the two communicating points of mobile network 
component, and in the case of satellite, the signal is beamed towards the 
communicating point of mobile network components, if any active attacker 
nearer to mobile network components with a powerful satellite receiver can
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Figure 3.1: Illegal access and Eavesdropping.
get the signal.
3.1 The importance of Protection
As mentioned earlier, the radio path and the access to the mobile services 
are the two areas where a mobile communication system naturally does not 
provide the same level of protection as a fixed network, unless additional 
security measures are taken. The two basic threats, interception of data from 
the air interface and illegitimate access to a mobile services are illustrated in 
Fig 3.1.
From Fig 3.1, we see that illegal access to the mobile service is possible, 
if the confidentiality of subscriber identity is not provided. One can easily 
access the mobile service illegally by intercepting and copying the valid sub­
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scriber identity like IMSI, and send it next time to the mobile network. This 
causes wrong billing to the legitimate user. This shows the importance of 
confidentiality of subscriber identity like IMSI and importance of verifying 
the identity of any user, to stop illegal access.
The illegitimate use of a mobile service is not only of concern with respect 
to proper billing and it also clearly important that billing is always possible 
only the subscriber, who has caused the charge, and should be billed for it.
Generally, user data is transmitted over traffic channel as well as the 
signalling channels. The signalling channel carries, apart from obvious user 
related signalling information elements such as the called and calling tele­
phone number, user data in the form of short messages. This service allows 
the user to receive and send message up to 160 bytes without activating 
a traffic channel. Anyone intercepting these channels can identify the call­
ing and the called numbers, and user data. This shows the importance of 
confidentiality of user data.
The eavesdropping of radio path is shown in Fig 3.1. If the confidential­
ity of user related data (voice data) is not provided in the radio path, then 
eavesdropping is possible by using a radio scanner. But even with the con­
fidentiality of user voice data like encryption, cannot prevent eavesdropping 
completely. But can make sure that the voice data is being eavesdropped is 
unintelligible [8].
3.1.1 Monitoring
Basically interception of user data or signalling information related to the 
user can be monitored with the help of radio scanners. Using that, calls to 
and from all phones in a particular cell can be monitored, or specific numbers
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can be entered into a log (i.e a record of importance), and all other calls can 
be ignored. The equipment monitors the data on the cell’s control channel 
and switches a radio scanner to the specified voice frequency when the phone 
makes or receives a call in that cell. The equipment will change to a new 
voice frequency each time the phone switches, ensuring that the complete 
call is monitored from start to finish. There is one product called cellmate 
model B it supposedly allows you to dial in a cellular phone number, and 
listen to both sides of the call.
There is also an interesting article on “Cellular Phreaks and Code Dudes” 
by John Markoff (markoff@nyt.com), which discusses the latest rage of Silicon 
Valley hackers in Cellular phones [26]. He gives an example of how two 
phreaks hacked into an OKI 900 cellular phone and some of the features 
they discovered:
( 1 ) how to use it as a cellular scanner.
(2 ) with the manufacturer’s interface so one can attach the phone to a 
portable computer.
(3 ) one of the phreaks wrote some software to track other portable phones 
as they move from cell to cell, this allows him to display the approxi­
mate locations of each phone since he knows the geographical locations 
of each cell.
In mobile communications using GSM, although intelligent SIM card pre­
vents the fraud, criminals are now stealing phones and reselling them or use 
their own quite legal SIM cards [25]. According to the features GSM phone 
do not identify themselves to the network, so there should be some iden­
tity whether the actual phone is stolen or not, though the SIM card in the 
phone is valid. This problem was solved by writing GSM network software
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to identity whether the actual phone is stolen or not.
To protect the network and the subscribers against such attacks, the 
implementation of the following security features is important in any mobile 
network on both, air inter face and fixed infrastructure side.
(1) Subscriber identity confidentiality
(2 ) Subscriber identity authentication
(3) User data confidentiality
(4) Signalling information confidentiality
3.2 Weaknesses of GSM
This section discusses certain weakness in the current GSM system. The 
weakness and insecurities in the current GSM system are:
3.2.1 IMSI Exposure
The basic reason behind assigning TMSI is to protect the IMSI of a particular 
subscription during call attempts any where in the network. An illegal sub­
scription access to the mobile service is possible through the IMSI exposure. 
Suppose, if any spoofer intercepts and copies this number at the network, 
can easily trace that particular subscription and can simply cause problems 
like, sending the copied IMSI to the old VLR location and ask for a location 
update information like triplet (RAND, SRES, K c). But, this is sent in the 
form of TMSI from mobile station to the network during every call attempt. 
The international mobile subscriber’s identity (IMSI) is transmitted from the
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Figure 3.2: IMSI Exposure.
37
mobile station only when the mobile station is turned on for the first time. 
During all other time, temporary mobile subscriber’s identity (TMSI) is sent 
instead of IMSI for identification purposes, which in inturn supplied by the 
VLR during a valid location update to that VLR.
All base stations transmit their location identity (LAI) information in 
a particular broadcast control channel in their cell. If a mobile station of 
different VLR area moves to the new cell of another VLR area. It finds that 
the LAI stored on it, is different from the one transmitting locally in a current 
cell. Then it realises that it is in different area. So it asks for location update 
by sending a location update request with the old LAI and TMSI, to the new 
VLR attached to the new cell. This is illustrated in Fig 3.2. Upon receiving 
the TMSI and LAI, the new VLR finds that it does not have any details on 
the newly entered mobile station. But through the TMSI and LAI, the VLR 
can easily identify, who could have assigned this TMSI i.e which VLR could 
have assigned this TMSI to the newly entered mobile station. Once it knows 
which VLR to contact, to get the IMSI and other subscriber details of this 
newly entered mobile station, it sends a request to that old VLR for IMSI. 
The old VLR responds to this request by sending the IMSI and triplet to the 
requesting VLR. Upon getting this, the new VLR assigns new TMSI and LAI 
to the newly entered mobile station. In a busy mobile network like GSM, 
there could be many such location updates. So this leads to many different 
IMSIs and triplets being exposed across the fixed infrastructure of mobile 
network. As mentioned earlier, if any active attacker copies this IMSI at the 
fixed infrastructure of a mobile network, he can easily trace that particular 
subscription and cause problems like, sending the copied IMSI to the old VLR 
position and asked for subscriber data like triplet (RAND, SRES, K c)- Using 
a triplet, one can decipher the encrypted voice of a particular subscription 
for that particular mobile call.
38
3.2.2 Triplet Exposure
When a mobile station roams to another PLMN first, it asks for an inter 
PLMN location update to the visited PLMN to register in the visited PLMN 
for the purpose of receiving and making calls. To enable the inter PLMN lo­
cation update, the visited PLMN contacts the Home PLMN of the newly en­
tered mobile station for getting the subscription details of the newly entered 
mobile station. To serve the request from visited PLMN, the transmission 
of subscriber data like triplet is carried out in the insecure channel between 
Home PLMN and the visited PLMN. This reveals the fact that the triplet is 
being sent unprotected from the Home PLMN to the visited PLMN in the 
insecure channel [9]. This is illustrated in Fig 3.3.
According to the constrain in the GSM that, only Home PLMN can au­
thenticate their subscriber in any foreign network, so the subscriber data like 
triplet, have to be sent from Home PLMN every time during inter PLMN 
location update of a mobile station. Here, the triplet contains important 
parameters like RAND, SRES, and K c. Because this happens between two 
countries, the active attackers at the border, has higher chances of intercept­
ing these signals in the insecure channel, and masquerade with it. Using K c in 
the triplet, one can decipher the encrypted voice of a particular subscription.
3.2.3 Insecure Voice Across the Network
In the existing security system for GSM, the user voice data is protected 
only in the air interface between mobile station and the base station (local 
transceiver). The user voice data is not protected at the fixed infrastructure 
of the mobile network. It passes unenciphered voice data across the fixed 








Figure 3.4: Insecure Voice Across the Network.
arrow line. Even when the mobile call goes to other network, the voice data 
is not protected. This is shown in Fig 3.4 with a dotted line. In this case, 
any active eavesdroppers can listen to the conversations and monitor mobile 
calls in the border or in the fixed infrastructure of the mobile network.
3.2.4 Weakness In Reusing Iic
In the current GSM system, the other option regarding the enciphering key 
K c is reusing the previous Kc for enciphering user data. The K c is always 
stored. In this case only both ends should confirm that they have a common 
key. This can be achieved by using the cipher key sequence number. This 
cipher key sequence number is incremented every time the A8 algorithm runs. 
This process occurs at both ends i.e, in network side as well as the mobile 
station side. But it can be incremented only up to four value after that it 
starts from zero. So the cipher key sequence number is sent across the air 
and compared to ensure that the K c is the same at both ends.
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In this case, most of the time previous K c is used, instead of generating a 
new enciphering key for every call. Though there is provision for generating 
a new K c every time, this is not used most of the time, because cross check­
ing each and every time for a new enciphering key at both sides is a time 
consuming process. For this reason, the previous enciphering key is used 
for enciphering/deciphering current voice data. But using the previous enci­
phering key is highly risky because it would produce the same old previous 
key stream for enciphering/deciphering current voice data.
This is a weakness for encipherment, because both previous conversation 
and the present conversation, are encrypted using the same key stream. But 
the ciphertext output may be different, because of the different input voice 
data. Though the enciphered voice data is different every time, play back 
of the previous enciphered voice data to the present conversation may result 
in loss of message authentication, because in the receiving end it is hard to 




This chapter describes the DES encryption algorithm and its use in the pro­
posed security system for GSM. The proposed security system for GSM pro­
vides new security features, which solve security problems in the existing 
GSM, which were discussed in the last chapter. It also describes the storage 
and the implementation of DES in the mobile network components and the 
mobile stations in a proposed security system for GSM.
4.1 DES Encryption Algorithm
Data Encryption Standard (DES) is an encryption algorithm which incor­
porates mathematical functions for transforming a given pattern of 64 bits 
(input) into a different pattern of 64 bits (output) [6,7]. This transformation 
is controlled by a 64 bit key, of which 56 bits are used in the algorithmic 
transform and 8 bits are used as parity bits for detecting errors within the 
key itself. DES is classified as a symmetric or single secret key cryptosystem, 
which means it uses same key to encrypt and decrypt the message. Hence
43
the same secret key must be known to both the sender and the receiver.
4.2 DES Encryption
The following steps describe the function of the DES algorithm [4,20]. These
steps are shown in Fig 4.1.
Input: 64 bit input message blocks (T ) / one block at a time.
Step 1: Input Block T is transposed under an initial fixed bit
permutation /P ,  giving TO =  7P(T).
Step 2 : The 64 permuted data bits are broken into a 32 right half
and a 32 bit left half.
Step 3: 16 iterations of a function /  combines substitution and
transposition.
Notation :
Ti : ith iteration of function /  on 64 bit input block
U-. left halves of T{
R i : right halves of T{
where l <  i <  16
Ti =— L{ Ri
where
L { —  ¿ i,. . . ,  ¿32 (left 32 bits after ith iteration)
R i  — ¿33, •. . ,  ¿64 (right 32 bits after ith iteration) 
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Where,
0 : exclusive or operation 
f ( R i - i ,K { ) :  binary vector of length 32 
K{\ 48 bit key 
Step 4: After 16 iterations:
(1) Left and right halves not exchanged.
(2 ) Concatenated block R i&L\q is input to the final inverse permutation 
I P - 1 (inverse of the initial permutation), this is necessary in order 
to ensure that the same algorithm can be used both to encipher and 
decipher.
Output: 64 bit ciphertext output block.
4.3 DES Decryption
Deciphering is performed using the same algorithm.
For deciphering process, the same keys must be taken in reverse order, 
i.e, (A"i6, K i5, . . . ,  K\).
Reasons:
1 ) The final permutation I P  1 1 the inverse of the initial permutation IP
2) Iteration j derives from iteration (j — 1) in the following manner:
Lj — Rj — 1 (4.1)
Rj =  Lj — 1 +  f (R j  — 1, K j ) (4.2)
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equations 4.1 and 4.2 shows that the result of each iteration depends 
on the previous iteration. By rewriting these equations in terms of
Rj — 1 and Lj — 1 (4-3)
and
Lj — l — Rj +  f (R j  — 1, Kj)  (4.4)
Substituting 4.3 into 4.4, gives
Lj — 1 =  Rj +  f ( L j ,K j )  (4.5)
Equations 4.3 and 4.5 shows that the same value can be obtained from the 
result of later cycles. Hence the keys are reversed for deciphering. The 
algorithm itself is not reversed. From eqn 4.3 and 4.5 we can use DES to 
encrypt a string and also decrypt the result to derive the plaintext again.
4.4 Modes of DES
DES can be configured and used in four different modes of operations. They 
are as follows.
( 1 ) Electronic Codebook Mode /  Block Cipher Mode (ECB).
(2 ) Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC).
(3) Output Feedback Mode (OFB).
(4) Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB).
But in this project the DES is implemented in both OFB and CFB mode. 
The DES in OFB is used to encrypt user’s voice data between a mobile station
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and the fixed infrastructure of the GSM network. The DES in CFB mode is 
used only in the fixed infrastructure of the GSM network for encrypting traffic 
data and subscribers data transferring across the mobile network components 
within the same networks or other networks. The session keys, triplets and 
IMSI are considered as subscribers data and request for location update 
and other control signals flowing across the mobile network components are 
considered as traffic data. These two operating modes are described below.
4.4.1 CFB Mode
The DES in CFB mode is a data dependent encipherment stream cipher 
with the feedback input of block ciphertext output (64 bits) [1 1 ]. Because 
every time it takes previous ciphertext block and feeds that as an input for 
enciphering. Since ciphertext is a function of data stream and the output 
from DES algorithm, the algorithm indirectly depends on input data stream 
and takes the input data stream into the DES engine for producing the 
ciphertext. This is illustrated in fig 4.2. In the CFB mode the J bits of input 
data stream (1 <  J <  64) are XO R’ed with J bits of ciphertext output, into 
DES input. In this method, single error in the received stream will cause error 
propagation over 64-bit block and this leads to loss of synchronisation. So 
the system can be resynchronised by removing the added bits and requesting 
the sender to retransmit the last 64 bits. This mode is used for encrypting 
the subscribers data and traffic data like triplets, IMSI, session keys and 
other signals regarding location updates, to prove the message authentication 
and data integrity. But this mode is not used for encrypting the voice data 
because any added or deleted bits to enciphered voice data due to interference 
and noise in the air interface over radio channels causes corrupted voice data 
for next 64 bits at the receiving end. In this case, it is not feasible to request
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Figure 4.2: DES in CFB Mode.
the mobile phone user to retransmit the voice data for corrupted bits. In 
order to encrypt the voice data, the DES in OFB mode is used.
4.4.2 OFB Mode
The DES in OFB mode is a data independent encipherment stream cipher 
with a feedback input of output(64 bits) [11]. Every time it takes previous 
output from DES i.e key stream and feed that as an initial input for enci­
phering. The successive ciphertext bits are produced from the X O R ’ed bits 
of output key stream from DES and successive bits of the clear input data 
stream. Since feedback input of output block is neither a function nor de­
pendent on the cipher text and data stream, and as no data stream is goes 
inside the DES engine, this method is called data independent encipherment 
stream cipher. This method is also known as key auto key mode.
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Figure 4.3: DES in OFB Mode.
agation in a noisy narrowband digital voice environment. Hence this mode is 
used to encrypt the user’s voice across the air interface and also in the fixed 
infrastructure of the mobile network. To decipher the data, it is necessary 
only to X O R  the identical DES output keystream against the received cipher­
text stream. But this requires proper seeded value of initialization vector and 
private key, because this mode purely acts as random number generator. Bit 
synchronization is necessary for this method of encipherment. Here one bit 
error in the received ciphertext stream will result in only one bit of error in 
the cleartext output of decipherment. However external protocols existing in 
the present GSM communication system protect against insertion or deletion 
of bits.
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4.5 Utilization of DES
This section describes the storage and the implementation of DES in the 
mobile network components and the mobile station in a proposed security 
system for GSM.
4.5.1 DES Storage
The DES algorithm in OFB mode is stored in a Smart card (i.e) in the SIM 
at the mobile station. The main purpose of implementing DES in the SIM 
is to encipher/decipher voice data to and from the mobile station. This 
mode of DES is implemented and stored in all valid SIM along with other 
parameters and an other algorithm for authentication. The DES algorithm 
in both OFB and CFB mode is implemented and stored in all mobile net­
work components of GSM PLMN, such as the Base Station Station (BSS), 
Mobile Service Switching Center (MSC), Gateway Mobile Service Switching 
Center (Gateway MSC), Home Location Register (HLR) and Visitor Loca­
tion Register (VLR). Since these network components have to communicate 
with other network components for subscribers data and mobile station for 
voice data, they utilize OFB mode for encrypting/decrypting voice data from 
the mobile station and CFB mode for encrypting/decrypting the subscribers 
and traffic data from other mobile network components. These two mode of 
DES will be necessary for BSS, MSC and GatewayMSC. Because they have 
to switch the mobile calls to the proper route and transmit the voice data 
across the air as well as they have to receive the receive other traffic data 
and subscribers data from VLR and HLR.
But the mobile network components like AUC/HLR and VLR, though 
they have OFB and CFB mode of DES stored and implemented with them,
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they use only CFB mode of DES to communicate with other network compo­
nents. Because these network components can only involve in sending traffic 
data and subscribers data to MSC, GatewayMSC, and BSS and more over 
the user voice data is not passed over these components. Fig 4.4 illustrates 
the storage of DES algorithm.
4.5.2 DES Implementation
In the SIM, the DES in output feedback mode takes enciphering/deciphering 
private key, initialisation vector and data stream to be enciphered. The 
private key K c for enciphering/deciphering is 64 bit long and is unique for 
each user, and is stored only in the SIM. The initialisation vector is 64 bit 
long and this has to be different for each and every call. This is achieved 
as a result of authentication check. During the authentication process, 128 
bit RAND is supplied everytime to the SIM. The supplied RAND is stored 
and the first 64 bit of it is used as IV for enciphering/deciphering of voice 
data. This makes sure that every time a different ciphertext is produced for 
encipherment of same the messages under the same private key, any number 
of times.
Here, the proposed security system undertakes the normal authentication 
protocol which is existing in the current GSM system and it is assumed that 
this authentication protocol executed to check the authenticity of particular 
subscription before the proposed security encryption scheme works. In the 
proposed security system, it is only changing the enciphering scheme handled 
at the mobile station of the existing GSM system.
In the BSS, to encipher/decipher user’s voice data, the DES in OFB 
mode takes the same input like first 64 bit of RAND as IV and K C1 which is 
supplied to BSS as a result of session key distribution K nc from AUC/HLR
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Figure 4.4: Utilization of DES.
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along with the normal authentication protocol for every call.
In the BSS, for enciphering/deciphering voice data across the fixed in­
frastructure of the mobile network components such as MSC and Gateway 
MSC, the DES in OFB mode is used. But using different key K nc and IV. 
This is supplied as a result of session key distribution from AUC/HLR.
The AUC/HLR uses DES in CFB mode to encipher the K nc to be dis­
tributed to the mobile network components such as BSS, MSC and Gateway 
MSC. It encrypts the K nc separately using respective destinations private 
key. But the distributed K nc is used for enciphering/deciphering voice data 
at the distributed network components.
At the BSS, MSC and Gateway MSC, as they have to handle both voice 
data and subscribers data, it determines whether incoming signal is voice 
data or subscriber data by checking the header. If it is voice data, these 
components use DES in OFB mode to encipher/decipher, otherwise they use 
DES in CFB mode to encipher/decipher subscribers and traffic data.
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Chapter 5
Key Management for Secure 
Mobile Communications
This chapter discusses the organisation of private keys and distribution of ses­
sion keys for every mobile call in the proposed security system for GSM. In 
the mobile station, a private key for enciphering/deciphering of mobile calls 
(voice data) is allocated and stored in a smart card. The private keys for all 
the mobile network components to encipher/decipher subscribers data and 
traffic data (non voice data) are allocated initially and stored in a secure unit 
adhere to each mobile network component. These private keys are fixed and 
may be changed after a long period. The keys for enciphering/deciphering 
mobile calls at the fixed infrastructure of mobile network components are 
generated and distributed instantaneously for every call, by the authentica­
tion center (AUC/H LR) to the corresponding mobile network components. 
These keys are called session keys. The distribution of these session keys 
takes place only within the fixed infrastructure of mobile network, within 
one PLMN or between two PLMNs, in the case of international mobile calls.
The proposed security system provides two different levels of private key
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allocations within the mobile network components of GSM PLMN for enci­
phering/ deciphering subscribers data and traffic data.
5.1 PLM N Key Allocations
As mentioned above, the mobile network components where private key allo­
cations taken place are the BSS, MSC, GatewayMSC, AUC/HLR, VLR, and 
the mobile station. These private keys are assumed to have been allocated 
prior to the function of the proposed security system for GSM. In the mo­
bile station, these keys are used for enciphering/deciphering voice data. In 
the fixed infrastructure side, these private keys are used only for encipher­
ing/deciphering subscribers data (non voice data).
The private key K c for enciphering/deciphering voice data to and from the 
mobile station is stored inside the smart card of a mobile station. Another 
key Ki is provided in the mobile station (smart cards) for authentication 
purposes. The key K c will be stored initially in the smart card when a user 
buys a SIM for the first time.
The first level of private key allocation to the mobile network components 
is the allocation of intra PLMN key table to the mobile network components 
within the same PLMN. The use of which the mobile network components 
can communicate with each other using mobile network components within 
the same PLMN during the transfer of subscriber related data such as IMSI 
and Triplet. The private key allocations to the mobile network components 
for transferring subscriber data is illustrated by the intra PLMN key table 
in Fig 5.1.
Fig 5.1 shows that each network component has a key table, which stores 
the private key of all other mobile network components of the same PLMN.
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Figure 5.1: Private Key Allocations Within PLMN.
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For example, the AUC/HLR has an intra PLMN key table which contains the 
private keys of all other network components within the same PLMN. But 
the private key of AUC/HLR is key A. All other mobile network components 
in the same PLMN can communicate with AUC/HLR using the key A. This 
key table is therefore known as the intra PLMN key table. This intra PLMN 
key table is assumed to have been allocated prior to the function of proposed 
security system for GSM.
These private keys in the intra PLMN key table at the mobile network 
components are used only to encrypt/decrypt subscriber data. For example 
if V LR 1 requests for an IMSI from VLR2, then VLR2 searches for the private 
key of V LRl in its intra PLMN table and encrypts IMSI with V L R l’s private 
key using DES in CFB mode, and sends it to the VLR2 . This shown in 
Fig 5.1.
There is a special pseudo random number generator algorithm is stored 
in all mobile network components. It produces a predicted sequence of 64 bit 
random number with respect to a special key. The special key is produced 
by concatenation of the first 32 bits of sender’s and receiver’s private key. 
This 64 bit pseudo random output is used as an initial input (IV) to the DES 
in CFB mode to ensure that both sender and receiver have the same IV to 
synchronise the encryption/decryption at both ends.
5.2 Inter PLMN Key Allocations
The second level of private key allocation to the mobile network components 
consists of a special one to one inter network keys which are stored in the 
AUC/HLRs of a GSM PLMN in the form of table. They are used to commu­
nicate with AUC/HLR of other PLMN during session key distribution and
58
AU C/H LR  of PLMN 2
pass 2
Key 1,2 PLMN 1 Pass 1 64 bit
key 2,4 PLMN 4 Pass 4 Pesudo
Key 2,3 PLMN 3 Pass 3 Random
Number
Kev 2.n PLMN n Pass n Generator
Inter PLMN key table of PLMN 2
pass 3
Key 2,3 PLMN 2 Pass 2 64 bit
key 3,1 PLMN 1 Pass 1 Pesudo
Key 4,3 PLMN 4 Pass 4 Random
Number
Key 3,n PLMN n Pass n Generator
Inter PLMN key table of PLMN 3
AU C/H LR  of PLMN 3
AUC/H LR of PLMN 1
pass 1
Key 1,2 PLMN 2 Pass 2 64 bit
key 4,1 PLMN 4 Pass 4 Pesudo
Key 3,1 PLMN 3 Pass 3 Random
Number
Key l,n PLMN n Pass n Generator
Inter PLMN key table of PLMN 1
pass 4
Key 4,1 PLMN 1 Pass 1 64 bit
key 2,4 PLMN 2 Pass 2 Pesudo
Key 4,3 PLMN 3 Pass 3 Random
Number
Key 4,n PLMN n Pass n Generator
Inter PLMN key table of PLMN 4
AUC/HLR of PLMN 4
Figure 5.2: Inter PLMN Key Allocations.
international location update. Apart from the intra PLMN key table to com­
municate with other mobile network components within the same PLMN, all 
the AUC/HLRs of GSM PLMN have an one more private key table, called 
inter PLMN key table, which is used to communicate with other AUC/HLR 
in GSM PLMN. This is illustrated in Fig 5.1.
The contents of inter PLMN key table is illustrated in Fig 5.2. This 
table resides in all AUC/HLRs of GSM PLMN. In Fig 5.2, the inter PLMN 
key table of PLMN 1 has four boxes. The leftmost box contains one to 
one network keys for PLMN 1 . Using that, the AUC/HLR of PLMN 1 
communicates with the other PLMN in the GSM PLMN. For example, if 
AU C/H LR of PLMN 1 sends a request to the AUC/HLR of PLMN 2 for 
subscriber data such as triplet, then the PLMN 2 uses key 1,2 to encrypt the 
triplet and sends it to the AUC/HLR of PLMN 1 .
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The second box shows the PLMN which is attached to the key in the 
first box. The third box shows the password, which is associated with the 
PLMN in the second box. This is used to prove the identity of PLMN during 
the inter network communications such as international location update and 
international mobile calls. If the PLMN 2 sends a request for triplet to the 
PLMN 1 , then the request is send encrypted in the form of authentication 
protocol to PLMN 1 . The encrypted authentication protocol contains, the 
request for triplet and sender’s password i.e, password of PLMN 2 which is 
pass 2. Once the PLMN 1 receives the request from the PLMN 2 in the form 
of an encrypted authentication protocol, the PLMN 1 uses the key keyi)2 
from its intra PLMN key table to decrypt the request. After it decrypts the 
request, the PLMN 1 verifies the password in the request with the one stored 
along with the key keyi)2 i.e, pass 2. If these two matches, then the PLMN 
1 sends the encrypted triplet to the PLMN 2.
The fourth box shows the 64 bit pseudo random number generator al­
gorithm which produces predictable sequences of 64 bit output every time 
with an input 64 bit key. The input 64 bit key can be taken from the first 
box of the inter PLMN key table. If the PLMN 2 sends encrypted request 
to the PLMN 1 for triplet, then the PLMN 1 takes the key keyit2 from its 
inter PLMN key table, inputs the key keyif2 to the random number generator 
algorithm and gets the 64 bit output and feed that as the IV to the DES in 
CFB mode to decipher the encrypted request from the PLMN2. The key for 
decipherment is same as the key keyi,2-
The inter PLMN key table is maintained in all AUC/HLRs and also in 
all GatewayMSC of a PLMN. Because, it is the entry and exit point of one 
mobile network. Using this key table, GatewayMSC can check the incoming 
enciphered data, before entering the home mobile network. But the inter 
PLMN key table in the GatewayMSC cannot be handled independently. It
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must be operated in conjunction with the AUC/HLR of the home mobile 
network.
5.3 Key Distribution Protocol
The private keys of mobile network components are used for enciphering/deciphering 
subscribers data i.e, non voice data. There is a session key distribution pro­
tocol for every call of mobile station, from authentication center AUC to the 
corresponding mobile network components to encipher/decipher the voice 
data across the fixed infrastructure of the mobile network.
This key distribution protocol is governed by the AUC/HLR of one PLMN.
The condition prior to the session key distribution is that the AUC/HLR 
must know the BSS locations of mobile stations, so that the session key for 
enciphering/deciphering voice data can be distributed to the corresponding 
BSSs, MSCs and VLRs. The BSS location of a mobile stations can be iden­
tified as a result of a call initiating request from the mobile station as well 
as paging of the mobile station.
The session key distribution protocol can be used for two different pur­
pose. It can be used for calls within one PLMN or calls between two PLMNs.
5.3.1 Key Distribution Protocol for calls within same 
PLMN
The session key generating center i.e, the Authentication center (AUC) holds 
private keys of all the mobile network components in the intra PLMN key 
table to encrypt/decrypt subscriber data. This key table is used by the 
session key distribution protocol.
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Figure 5.3: Key Distribution Protocol
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The session key distribution protocol is illustrated in Fig 5.3. This pro­
tocol is executed only if the dialed number is within the same PLMN.
The session key generating center i.e, the authentication center (AUC) 
runs a special key generating algorithm to generate a 64 bit random number 
i.e a random key to be used as the session key labeled as X  in Fig 5.3. If the 
mobile station A initialise call to the mobile station B in the same PLMN, 
then the VLR 1 sends the message to the AUC/HLR that mobile station A 
in BSS 1 attempts to call mobile station B. Upon receiving this message the 
AUC/HLR does the paging for the mobile station B and finds the BSSl of 
mobile station B.
Once it finds all other network components attached to these locations. 
It encrypts the 64 bit random key X (session key) using the BSS l ’s, BSS 
2’s, MSC l ’s, MSC 2’s, VLR l ’s and VLR 2’s private keys Key D, Key G, 
key C, key F, key A and key B respectively and separately, and distributes it 
to all these network components. Upon receiving the enciphered session key, 
these components decrypt the random session key X, using their respective 
private key to retrieve the plain session key X, at each end.
Using this session key X, the call can be encrypted across the fixed in­
frastructure side of the mobile network. The encrypted voice using the key 
X  across the network is shown in Fig 5.3 with a thick double arrow line from 
BSS 1 to BSS 2 via MSC 1 and MSC 2. ’
Every time a new session key is generated for every conversation, in the 
network side. The session key distributed to VLR would be use full at the 
time of call handovers as the mobile station moves to different cell during 
the conversation.
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Figure 5.4: Key Distribution Protocol for Inter PLMN Calls.
5.3.2 Key Distribution Protocol for Inter PLM N Calls
This session key distribution protocol is executed only if the dialed mobile 
station is currently registered in some other PLMN. This session key distri­
bution protocol is illustrated in Fig 5.4.
This is quite similar to the key distribution protocol for calls within same 
PLMN. The only difference is in the mobile components where the session 
keys are distributed.
Once the request comes from the Visitor Location Register (VLR) to the 
AU C/H LR of PLMN 1 that mobile station A would like to communicate 
with mobile station B in PLMN 2. The AUC/HLR of PLMN 1 finds the 
BSS location of the mobile station A and Home PLMN of mobile station
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B. It also finds the associated mobile network components attached to these 
BSSs.
To setup the international mobile call from PLMN 1 to PLMN 2, the 
AUC/H LR of PLMN 1 generates 64 bit random key K nc. Once it is generated 
the AUC/HLR of PLMN 1 takes the private key of AUC/HLR of PLMN 2 
from its inter PLMN key table and private key of BSS from its intra PLMN 
key table and encrypts the session key K nc with the corresponding private 
keys obtained from these tables and distributes the encrypted session keys 
to the AUC/HLR of PLMN 2’s and BSS. Once the AUC/HLR of PLMN 2 
decrypts the session key K nc at their end, it passes the session key K nc to its 
GatewayMSC and at the same time, BSS of PLMN 1 decrypts the session 
key K nc simultaneously.
During a call, these distributed session key K nc at BSS and GatewayMSC 
is used to encrypt/decrypt the voice data from BSS of PLMN 1 to Gate­
wayMSC of PLMN 2.
65
Chapter 6
Authentication and New 
Secure Location Updates
This chapter describes the authentication protocol employed in the proposed 
security system for GSM, between two PLMNs during inter PLMN mobile 
calls and international location update of mobile stations. The proposed 
security system employs authentication protocol between two PLMNs, in two 
different ways. One is an authentication protocol for inter PLMN mobile calls 
and second is an authentication protocol for inter PLMN location update of 
mobile station. These two authentication protocols secure the transmission 
of session key and triplet in the insecure channel between two PLMNs.
It also discusses the secure location update of subscriber data between 
two VLR area of the same PLMN. The secure location update between two 
VLR location is achieved in the same way as the secure inter PLMN location 
update, but without using any authentication protocol as the location update 
happens to be within the same PLMN. The secure location update between 
two VLR region and authentication protocol for inter PLMN location Update 
( secure international location update) solve the IMSI exposure and triplet
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Border
Figure 6.1: Authentication Protocol for IDD calls, 
exposure respectively.
6.1 Authentication Protocol for Inter PLMN 
Calls
There are two main reasons that we have to have the authentication protocol 
for inter PLMN calls. The two reasons are explained bellow. In Fig 5.4 that
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the session key K nc is distributed to the AUC/HLR of PLMN 2, during the 
inter PLMN mobile call from PLMN 1 to PLMN 2.
These kind of session key distribution from one network to the other net­
work need some proof of identity of the sender, otherwise any active attacker 
at the border between two PLMNs can send wrong session key. These kind 
of session key distribution also need some protection of the session key being 
transmitted from one PLMN to the other PLMN. Since the communication 
channel between two PLMNs is insecure, any active attacker at the border 
between two PLMNs may intercept the session key and decipher the mobile 
call.
The authentication protocol is illustrated in Fig 6.1
The identity authentication protocol carries the session key K nc from 
PLMN 1 to PLMN 2. The message carried in the protocol is, Ek 12[Req, R, 
^ ( P A S S W D l ) ,  Knc]- In order to prove the authenticity of the sender’s 
identity, the protocol uses Aa'12(PASSWD 1). The AA12(PASSWD 1) is the 
encrypted text of password of PLMN 1. The encryption is carried out using 
DES in CFB mode with the K\$ as enciphering key and R as the IV (initial 
input). The key Ah,2 is taken from the inter PLMN key table of AUC/HLR 
of PLMN 1. PASSWD 1 is the unique password of PLMN 1 and R is 64 bit 
random number.
R plays an important role in the protocol. It prevents the authentication 
protocol from play back attack and is also used as the input in retrieving the 
password of a sender.
Once PLMN 2 receives the encrypted authentication protocol, it decrypts 
this message using the key Ah,2, and loads the received R as initial input to 
DES in CFB mode to decrypt the E^12(PASSWD1) using the Ah,2 to verify 
the identity i.e, to check the password of the sender.
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Once PLMN 2 decrypts the EKia(PASSWD1) It verifies the PASSWD 1 
with password stored along with the AT,2 in its inter PLMN table. If the two 
password matches, then it accepts the session key.
After PLMN 2 accepts the session key, it sends the acknowledgment to 
the PLMN 1 for the session key being received. This is illustrated in Fig 6.1 
as Ek 12[A_K, R, EA'1j2(PASSWD2)]. Upon receiving the encrypted acknowl­
edgment from PLMN 2. The PLMN 1 does the same way as PLMN 2 to 
decrypt and verify the password for accepting the acknowledgment.
6.2 Authentication Protocol for Inter PLMN  
Location Update
There are two main reasons that we have to have the authentication protocol 
for inter PLMN location update. The two reasons are explained bellow.
In Fig 3.3 that the triplet [R, SR, K c\ is transmitted from PLMN 2 to 
the AUC/HLR of PLMN 1 in an insecure channel at the border between the 
two PLMNs, during international location updates.
The contents of triplet has to be transferred to PLMN 1, when a mobile 
station B moves from PLMN 2 to PLMN 1. The two reasons that the mobile 
station B has to be registered to the visited PLMN 1 are for receiving and 
making a call at visited PLMN 1 and authenticating the newly entered mobile 
station B at the visited network PLMN 1.
These kind of triplet transmission from one network to the other network 
need some proof of identity of the sender, otherwise any active attacker at 
the border of a country can send the wrong triplet to the requested PLMN. 
These kind of triplet transmission also need some protection of the triplet
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Figure 6.2: Authentication Protocol for Inter PLMN Location Updates.
70
being transmitted from one PLMN to the other PLMN. Since the commu­
nication channel between two PLMNs is insecure, and any active attacker 
at the border may intercept the triplet and monitor the mobile call for that 
particular subscription, and decipher the voice data at the air interface of 
newly entered cell in PLMN 1, by using K c.
The authentication protocol for inter PLMN location update is illustrated 
in Fig 6.2.
In the visited PLMN 1 upon getting the request from the newly entered 
mobile station B for a location update with the TMSI sent, the visited PLMN
1 asks for IMSI from the mobile station B as it cannot determine the home 
PLMN of mobile station B with the TMSI. Once the mobile station B sends 
the IMSI to the AUC/HLR of PLMN 1, it finds the corresponding Home 
PLMN for the newly entered mobile station B, and sends a request to the 
PLMN 2 for getting the triplet. The request is sent in the form of an identity 
authentication protocol. The authentication protocol contains Ek 1>2 [Re(L 
£ Kl2 (PASSWD 1)].
Here Req is the request for triplet, R is the 64 bit random number to 
be used as an initialisation vector for decrypting the enciphered password 
£ A-12 (PASSWD 1) using the same private key Ah,2- The encrypted password 
E k 12(PASSWD 1) can be decrypted only if Ah,2 is known. PASSWD 1 is the 
password of the PLMN 1 to prove the identity of the sender. As mentioned 
earlier, that R is used to prevent the authentication protocol from playback 
attack.
PLMN 2 obtains the request by decrypting enciphered request using the 
same private key Ah,2. In order to verify the identity of the sender, the PLMN
2 again decrypts the EKli2(PASSWD 1) with the help of the same private 
key Ah,2 and R as the initial input (IV). Once the PLMN 2 confirms the
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identity, it serves the request by sending the encrypted protocol -#A"i2[Trip, 
R, EKl 2(PASSWD 2)] to PLMN 1.
Upon receiving encrypted protocol from PLMN 2, the PLMN 1 decrypts 
the encrypted protocol using the private key Ah,2- Before PLMN 1 accepts 
the triplet from PLMN 2, it verifies the identity of the sender by decrypting 
the jEa'i)2(PASSWD2) and retrieving the password of PLMN 1. Once PLMN 
2 accepts the triplet, it uses the RAND and SRES to authenticate the mobile 
station B, similar to the authentication check for particular subscription in 
the existing security system for GSM.
This authentication protocol for inter PLMN location update offers high 
security and solves the insecure international location update by not exposing 
the triplet.
6.3 Secure Location Update in Home PLMN
Recall the insecure location update by referring Fig 3.2 in the chapter 3. It 
is illustrated that, during the location update of mobile station between two 
VLR areas, the IMSI is passed between two VLR in the insecure channel and 
it should not be exposed any where in the network for the security reason. 
If any active attacker copies this IMSI at the fixed infrastructure of a mobile 
network, then this attacker can easily trace that particular subscription and 
can cause problems like, sending the copied IMSI to the old VLR position 
and request for information like triplet. Using a triplet, one can decipher 
the encrypted voice of a particular subscription for that particular mobile 
call. This is solved with the help of an implementation of DES in all mobile 
network component and allocation of intra PLMN key table to all the mobile 
network components.
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Fig 5.1 shows that each network component has a intra PLMN key table, 
which stores the private key of all other mobile network components of the 
same PLMN.
As mentioned earlier, these private keys within the mobile network com­
ponents are used only to encrypt/decrypt subscriber data. If a mobile station 
moves from one VLR area to another VLR area, then it has to formally reg­
ister with the newly entered VLR area to receive and make calls. During 
the registration, the new VLR asks for the IMSI and other subscribers data 
from the old VLR to authenticate, and to start enciphering/deciphering at 
the new VLR area. As said earlier these parameter should be secured during 
transmission from one VLR to the other. This can be done with the help of 
DES algorithm and intra PLMN key table stored in all VLRs.
During the new VLR’s request for IMSI and subscriber data from the old 
VLR, the old VLR searches for private key of the new VLR in its intra PLMN 
table and encrypts the IMSI with the new VLR’s private key using DES in 
CFB mode, and sends it to the new VLR. Then the new VLR decrypts the 
encrypted IMSI and subscribers data and updates the newly entered mobile 
station’s subscription details and IMSI in its database. This is shown Fig 5.1.
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Chapter 7
A  New Security System for 
Mobile Communications
This chapter discusses the complete voice encryption in a proposed security 
system for GSM. The complete voice encryption is achieved by incorporating 
end to end encryption and link by link encryption scheme across the GSM 
PLMN. Besides, it discusses the use of smart cards for mobile communication 
security. The proposed security system solves the problems arising due to 
insecure voice data across the network and weakness in reusing previous key 
K c, which exist in the current GSM system. The proposed idea of imple­
menting the DES in OFB mode in the SIM produces a different cipher key 
stream by using the same K c with a new IV generated for every call, solves 










Figure 7.1: Smart Card.
7.1 Smart Cards
The smart card is a new generation of portable microcomputer and ultimate 
personal computer with the size of ordinary bank card or credit card. In 
GSM, the SIM is a smart card. This smart card (SIM) can be put in and 
taken out of mobile station. A mobile station without a proper SIM is called 
mobile equipment, and which cannot communicate on its own.
The smart card is intelligent and highly secure as compared to bank cards 
because of its microcomputer and programmable memory. The microcom­
puter architecture of a smart card is illustrated in Fig 7.1. The six main 
significant parts of a smart card architecture are [28]:
The CPU (Microprocessor), that performs two basic functions, manipula­
tion and interpretation of data. The smart card carries out these functions by 
executing instructions stored in its memory. Each instruction has a unique 
binary code that can be interpreted by the microprocessor. For example 
10010010 means add and 10101011 means store in memory [16]. Basically 
CPU is 8 bit microprocessor. Each smart card’s CPU has its own instruction 
set and the instruction set depends on smart card manufacturers. Hence the 
assembly code for cryptographic algorithms in a smart card is CPU oriented. 
The I/O  port in smart card helps in communicating with the outside world.
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The ROM inside the smart card is a non-volatile memory. It contains 
the operating system of the smart card, the transmission protocols and com­
mands, as well as security algorithm and functions. The operating system of 
the smart card is also unique. It is not compatible with all smart card read­
ers. This unique operating system provides the important security features 
to the smart cards.
The RAM inside the smart card is a volatile memory. It is used by 
the CPU as a buffer for storing transmission data and as a very fast access 
memory for the intermediate results generated during the execution of an 
algorithm.
The EEPROM or EPROM inside the smart card is used as programmable 
memory to store application software which do not require frequent memory 
updates. The EEPROM is electrically erasable and reprogrammable, but 
EPROM is erased and reprogrammed only once. The AU is the added Units 
which acts as coprocessor and is needed in the case of a public key algorithm 
like RSA.
The security logic of a smart card provides features like PIN which identi­
fies a valid subscriber. The PIN is typically a 4 or 8 digit number. It prevents 
an unauthorised person from using the smard card for the same application 
as the rightful owner. If an unauthorised person tries to extract the PIN by 
trial and error, then after the fourth try the security logic inside the smart 
card blocks the non public data against any further access.
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7.2 Smart Card and Secure Mobile Commu­
nication
As mentioned earlier, the SIM is a smart card which contains all the sub­
scriber details and information, such as authentication key K {, IMSI, TMSI, 
LAI, authentication algorithm, A8, PIN and many other details. These are 
the main features given by the existing security system for GSM. The fol­
lowing modifications are done in the SIM, to enhance the security of the 
proposed system. They include implementation of DES algorithm in OFB 
mode to encipher/decipher voice data to and from mobile station, encipher­
ing key K c and a special provision for storing the first 64 bits of the 128 bit 
RAND supplied during entity authentication procedure of a mobile station. 
In this case, the A8 and the A5 algorithm which are implemented in the 
smart card and the mobile equipment can be removed respectively from the 
existing security system.
The A8 algorithm in the existing security system produces enciphering 
key K c after a successful authentication of a subscriber for every call at­
tempt. In the proposed security system, instead of producing enciphering 
key for every call attempt, the enciphering key K c, is stored in the SIM. In 
the existing security system for GSM, the A5 algorithm implemented in the 
mobile equipment is used to encipher/decipher voice data. The proposed 
security system uses the DES encryption algorithm in OFB mode which is 
cryptographically more stronger than the A5 encryption algorithm in the 
existing security system.
The implementation of the DES algorithm in the smart card is illustrated 
in Fig 7.2. In Fig 7.2, it is shown that XOR addition of key stream and voice 
data stream is done in the mobile equipment. Therefore if the SIM is taken
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Figure 7.2: Implementation of DES in Smart Card.
out of mobile station, the encryption/decryption procedure cannot work. The 
protocol inside the smart card is designed in such a way that enciphering 
procedure starts only after authentication steps, and after a special start 
enciphering instruction from the BSS.
In the proposed security system, since the A3 algorithm is stored in the 
smart card from existing security system, the authentication of the mobile 
station is performed for every call attempt prior to the commencement of 
encipherment of the voice data using DES algorithm.
Fig 7.3 shows the cryptographic protocol for authenticating mobile station 
and protocol for encipherment of the voice data across the air interface from 
mobile station to the fixed infrastructure of PLMN, in the proposed security 
system.
From Fig 7.3, it can be seen that when a mobile station sends a request 
to the PLMN to initialise a call, the PLMN sends a 128 bit RAND to the
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Figure 7.3: Smart Card Protocol.
SIM of a mobile station to check the authenticity of the subscriber. In the 
SIM, it inputs the RAND and Ki to the A5 algorithm to produce the SRES. 
Once the SIM produces the SRES, it sends SRES to the PLMN. In PLMN, 
it verifies the SERS with the one it generated already, if SRES matches, 
then PLMN distributes the Kc and Knc to the BSS. Once BSS gets these 
keys, it sends start enciphering message to the mobile station. Once the 
mobile station receives the start enciphering message, it enciphers/deciphers 
the voice data using the DES with the Kc as the enciphering key and the 
first 64 bits of RAND as initial input and transmits the encrypted voice data 
to the PLMN. The PLMN decrypts/encrypts voice data from mobile station 
using Kc and encrypts/decrypts voice data to and from fixed infrastructure 
of the mobile network using Knc.
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Key Controller
Figure 7.4: End to End Encryption
7.3 End to End Encryption
The end to end encryption is one approach to incorporating complete en­
cryption within the fixed infrastructure of a PLMN. It provides complete 
encryption of voice data between two communication points with the same 
enciphering key at both ends.
This is illustrated in Fig 7.4. From Fig 7.4, it can be seen that point A 
and D can communicate by encrypting the message using the common key 
Knc supplied by the key controller. In all other points such as B and C, they 
simply forward the enciphered data to the next connecting point [11]. This is 
called end to end encryption from A to D. The same technique is applied in 
the proposed security system for GSM across the fixed infrastructure side of 
a PLMN. The AUC/HLR takes the role of the key controller. The the BSSs 
in the fixed infrastructure of a PLMN take the role of point A and D and 
certain MSCs (not all) take the role of point B and C in Fig 7.4. The key Knc 
is supplied to the concern BSSs with the help of the session key distribution 
protocol from AUC/HLR. In the fixed infrastructure of a PLMN, certain 
MSCs simply switches the encrypted data from one BSS to the other BSS to 
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Figure 7.5: End to End Encryption of PLMN.
7.3.1 End to End Encryption of PLMN
As mentioned above, the end to end encryption of PLMN can only be done in 
conjunction with the session key distribution protocol discussed in chapter 5. 
Therefore, it is assumed here that the session key distribution protocol takes 
place automatically, once the AUC/HLR knows the BSS location of calling 
mobile station A and the BSS location of called mobile station B. This is 
illustrated in Fig 7.5.
Once the key distribution is over across the fixed infrastructure of the 
network, the key Knc becomes the session key, which is common to both 
the BSSs. The BSSs send start enciphering signal to the respective mobile 
stations. In the fixed infrastructure side, the voice data of mobile station A 
at BSS1 is encrypted using the key Knc. The encrypted voice at the BSS1 is 
transmitted to the BSS2 through the MSC, which is shown by a double arrow
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Figure 7.6: Link by Link Encryption.
thick line in Fig 7.5. Though MSC is used to switch the calls to different 
points, the voice data is not decrypted/encrypted at MSC because it does 
not have the key Knc. The end to end encryption scheme across the fixed 
infrastructure of a mobile network helps, if the mobile calls are switched and 
routed by many MSCs within one PLMN, because the voice data need not 
be decrypted/encrypted at any MSCs as the encrypted voice data passes 
through them and switches automatically to different point. The end to end 
encryption scheme reduces the delay by not encrypting/decrypting the voice 
data at all MSCs across the fixed infrastructure of a mobile network.
7.4 Link By Link Encryption
The link by link encryption is another approach to incorporating complete 
encryption across the GSM PLMN. The link by link encryption is illustrated 
in Fig 7.6. From Fig 7.6, if A wants to communicate with C by sending a 
encrypted message, it should first encrypt the message using B ’s private key 
and send it to link B. Once B receives the encrypted message from A, it 
decrypts the message and again encrypts the same message using C’s private 
key and sends it to C [11]. Then C decrypts the encrypted message from B 
and gets the original message sent by A. This is called link by link encryption.
The proposed security system incorporates link by link encryption scheme 
to achieve complete protection of the voice data across the GSM PLMN in­
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eluding the air interface. The link by link encryption scheme overcomes the 
insecure voice across the GSM PLMN, which is discussed in chapter 3. In 
order to protect the voice data across the GSM PLMN by the link by link 
encryption, the same voice data has to be encrypted/decrypted at most three 
different points if a mobile call is within one PLMN and at most four differ­
ent points if a mobile call goes between two PLMNs. This is because, the 
constrains in the GSM system such as, one PLMN’s encryption/decryption 
key cannot be used inside the another PLMN for encrypting/decrypting 
voice data i.e, each PLMN uses its own enciphering/deciphering key to en- 
crypt/decrypt the message in its Home PLMN.
The following sections explain link by link encryption for encrypting and 
decrypting the voice data across the GSM PLMN including the air interface.
7.4.1 Mobile Calls between two PLMNs
The configuration of link by link encryption for inter PLMN calls is illustrated 
in Fig 7.7. In Fig 7.7, the long broken lines with single arrow denote the key 
distribution protocol of PLMN 1, the short broken lines with single arrow 
denote the key distribution protocol of PLMN 2 and double arrow thick lines 
denote the encrypted voice data across the two PLMNs.
If a mobile station A attempts to call mobile station B, the authentica­
tion protocol takes place for these mobile stations to check the validity of 
subscription, once the locations of these mobile stations are identified by the 
AUC/HLR. After the successful authentication for these mobile station, the 
session key distribution takes place first in PLMN 1. At the end of the ses­
sion key distribution, the BSS 1 receives key 1 and key 2. The AUC/HLR 
of PLMN 2 receives key 2. These keys are sent encrypted to the mobile 
network components, using their respective enciphering/deciphering key for
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Figure 7.7: Link by Link Encryption of PLMN. 
subscriber data.
The session key 2 distribution from PLMN 1 to PLMN 2 is attained 
through identity authentication between PLMN 1 and PLMN 2. After PLMN 
2 receives key 2, the session key distribution takes place at PLMN 2, as a 
result of this session key distribution, BSS 2 receives key 3 and key 4, and 
GatewayMSC 2 receives key 3 and key 2. At this point, all the mobile network 
components have the keys to encipher/decipher voice data to and from other 
components.
There are now four different keys to encipher/decipher the voice data 
across the two PLMNs. The encrypted/decrypted voice from /to A is de- 
ciphered/enciphered at BSSl using key 1. The encrypted/decrypted voice 
from /to BSSl is deciphered/enciphered at Gateway MSC2 using key 2. The 
enciphered/decrypted voice data from/to Gateway MSC2 is deciphered/enciphered
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Figure 7.8: Complete voice encryption within one PLMN.
at BSS2 using key 3 and again enciphered and deciphered voice data from/to 
BSS2 is deciphered/enciphered at mobile station B using key 4.
Therefore, the voice data is enciphered/deciphered at four different links 
across the two PLMNs.
7.4.2 Special Case
As a special case in Fig 7.7, if a mobile station from the PLMN2 roamed to 
the PLMN1 and attempts to make a call to mobile station in the PLMN2. 
Then the encryption from the BSSl to the Gateway MSC2 will be governed 
by the PLMN1 and the rest of the paths are governed the the PLMN2.
7.4.3 Intra PLMN Calls Including Radio Part
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In a proposed security system, If a mobile station A calls mobile station B, 
which is in the same PLMN, then complete encryption of voice data can be 
achieved across the GSM PLMN including air interface between the mobile 
station and the BSS. This is illustrated in Fig 7.8.
To setup the call made by the mobile station A, the AUC/HLR finds 
locations of mobile station A and mobile station B and then it authenticates 
these mobile stations to check the validity of subscription. At the end of 
authentication process, the AUC/HLR confirms their authenticity. Then it 
executes the key distribution protocol to deliver the key K nc to the corre­
sponding BSSs. Here, it delivers K nc and K c to BSSl where mobile station 
A is located and it delivers K nc and K ci to BSS2 where mobile station B is 
located.
K ci and K c are the private keys of mobile station B and A respectively. 
The key K nc is the session key, which is common to both the BSSl and 
the BSS2. Though MSC in the fixed infrastructure of PLMN switches the 
mobile call to and from the BSSl. The session key K nc is not distributed 
to the MSC. It simply forwards the encrypted voice data to and from BSSl 
to BSS2. But the K nc is also distributed to the VLR1 and VLR2 which is 
attached to the BSSl and BSS2 respectively. The K nc in VLR1 and VLR2 
will be useful at the time of call handover, when the mobile station A or 
mobile station B moves to different cell during the call. Once the call setup 
is over, the concern BSSs send start enciphering to the respective mobile 
stations. The mobile station A encrypts/decrypts voice to and from BSS 1 
using key K c. The BSS 1 encrypts/decrypts voice to and from BSS 2 using 
key K nc. The BSS 2 encrypts/decrypts voice to and from mobile station 
B using K ci- Therefore, the voice data is enciphered/deciphered at three 




This thesis has proposed a new security system for mobile communication 
such as GSM. The proposed security system has attempted to provide secure 
mobile network by providing security features such as identity authentication 
of the PLMN, subscriber information confidentiality, and complete digital 
voice encryption across the radio interface and fixed infrastructure of the 
GSM PLMN. The ideas proposed for GSM security are basically solutions to 
certain other parts which were not considered in the existing GSM security 
system.
As a result of the proposed security system, the user voice data is pro­
tected from one point of communication to the other point of communication. 
If the two points of communication lie within the same PLMN, then the user 
voice data is encrypted/decrypted at three different points by three different 
encryption/decryption keys respectively. If the two points of communica­
tion lie in two different PLMNs, then user voice data is encrypted/decrypted 
at four different points by four different encryption/decryption keys respec­
tively. In this case, each PLMN chooses its own encryption/decryption key 
for enciphering/deciphering voice data at their fixed infrastructure of mobile
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network. The enciphering process starts only after proper authentication of 
the mobile station, which is identical to the authentication in the existing 
system for GSM.
The proposed idea also prevents unauthorised voice data from entering 
one PLMN. This is achieved by means of an authentication protocol to set 
up inter PLMN calls in the form of session key distribution. The inter PLMN 
key table allocated to the Gateway MSC helps in preventing unauthorised 
voice data, subscribers data and traffic data from entering one network.
The proposed security system has also attempted to provide encryption 
of subscriber data and traffic data such as IMSI, session key, triplet (RAND, 
SRES, K c), call setup and request for IMSI. They are encrypted during 
location update of mobile station between two VLR area within the same 
PLMN as well as international location update of mobile station between 
two different PLMN.
The proposed security system has a new identity authentication protocol 
for identification of the PLMN during request of triplet for the international 
location update. It also has a new identity authentication protocol for iden­
tification of PLMN during the distribution of session key from one network 
to the other network for international mobile calls.
The proposed security system for GSM holds all constrains like, a mobile 
station can only be authenticated by its Home PLMN irrespective of its 
PLMN location. The two different mobile stations can be communicated 
with different enciphering/deciphering key at both ends, but with the help 
of same enciphering/deciphering keys at the PLMN side.
The proposed security system has provided a new idea of implementing 
DES in the SIM for enciphering/deciphering user voice data to and from 
mobile station. This feature is quite different from existing GSM security
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system in which only the authentication algorithm and the key generation 
algorithm are implemented in the smart card.
The proposed security system has attempted to solve all the problems 
detected in the GSM system such as IMSI exposure, triplet exposure, in­
secure voice in the network and weakness of reusing the previous K c. The 
IMSI exposure is solved as a result of secure location update of mobile station 
between two VLR area. The triplet exposure is solved as a result of secure in­
ternational location update. The insecure voice in the network and weakness 
of reusing the previous K c are solved as a result of the DES implementation 
in the SIM and the link by link encryption.
8.1 Further Research
As mentioned in chapter 5, that all the AUC/HLRs belonging to a GSM 
PLMN has their own private keys and inter PLMN key tables to communicate 
with the other AUC/HLR of PLMN, during inter PLMN communications. 
In the proposed security system, it is assumed that these keys and tables are 
initially allocated before the commencement of secure mobile communication 
network. This is illustrated in Fig 5.2.
In Fig 5.2, If new PLMN is added to the GSM PLMN, for example (n +  
l)th  PLMN is added to the GSM PLMN, then the addition of (n +  l)th 
PLMN entry in the inter PLMN key table of all the existing AUC/HLRs of 
GSM PLMN has to be done in order to communicate with the new (n +  1)th 
PLMN. At the new (n +  l)th PLMN side, the one to one network private 
key for (n +  l)th  PLMN has to be generated for all the existing AUC/HLRs 
of GSM PLMN and distributed them to the corresponding AUC/HLRs of a 
GSM PLMN. The further research work can be done on distribution of one
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to one network private key from AUC/HLR of (n +  l)th PLMN to all the 
existing AUC/HLRs of GSM PLMN using the public key exchange method.
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Addendum Based on the 
External Examiner’s Report
A .l Proposed Security System For GSM
This section gives suggestions to solve the problems mentioned in section 3.2. 
The suggestions are based on the external examiner’s comments. Before we 
discuss our solutions to these problems, we propose a new key distribution 
protocol, a protocol to issue a ticket, a key management in the PLMN, and 
implementation of encryption algorithm in the mobile network components 
as well as in the mobile station. The following subsections describe the 
assumptions on the encryption algorithm and key management techniques 
adopted in the proposed security system. Using these assumptions and key 
management, we propose solutions to the weaknesses in the existing system.
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A .1.1 Special Changes in the Existing Security Sys­
tem
The proposed security system introduces some special changes in the existing 
security system. The Triple key DES in OFB mode is implemented instead 
of A3, A5, and A8 algorithms and used in all AUCs, GMSCs, VLRs and all 
Mobile Stations (MS) of all PLMNs within the GSM PLMN for the purpose 
of user voice data protection and also for subscriber data protection across 
the GSM PLMN. The Triple key DES is the “block mixing transformation” 
construction on DES. The 256-bit-block implementation of Triple key DES 
provides the strength of three DES keys. The exhaustive search on Triple 
key DES’s 224-bit keyspace is 2**168 times the conventional DES keyspace. 
The Triple key DES avoids Differential Cryptanalysis by using only balanced 
full-substitution tables and by using fully block mixing transform to avoid 
“divide and conquer” .
The replacement of A5 with the Triple key DES in the proposed security 
system provides the greater strength to the voice encryption. Because, ac­
cording to [31], the A5 is not very good. Its effective key length is at most 
five bytes and the key stream of A5 is the XOR of three clock controlled 
registers. The clock control of each register is that register’s own middle bit, 
XO R ’ed with a threshold function of the middle bits of all three registers (ie 
if two or more of the middle bits are 1, then invert each of these bits; other­
wise just use them as they are). The register lengths are 19, 22 and 23, and 
all the feedback polynomials are sparse. There is a trivial 240 attack (guess 
the contents of registers 1 and 2, work out register 3 from the keystream, 
and then step on to check whether the guess was right). 240 trial encryptions 
could take weeks on a workstation, but the low gate count of the algorithm 
means that a Xilinx chip can easily be programmed to do keysearch, and an
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A5 cracker might have a few dozen of these running at maybe 2 keys per 
microsecond each. For more details, the reader is referred to [31].
A secret key K a is implemented in the SIM, instead of the authentication 
key Ki and cipher key sequence number generating algorithm. A special cryp­
tographic algorithm is implemented only in the AUC of a Home PLMN and 
all SIM of a MSs belonging to that particular Home PLMN. This algorithm 
is unique for each PLMN and its subscribers. The special cryptographic al­
gorithm takes the secret key K ey a from the SIM and derives a new secret 
session key SK eyA , when a mobile station roams into the foreign PLMN. Be­
fore a mobile station executes the special cryptographic algorithm it should 
determine whether it has entered into a foreign PLMN or not. The transmit­
ting Location Area Identity (LAI) through the Broadcast Control Channels 
(BCCH) of a new cell denotes that the mobile station is in foreign PLMN. 
It then executes a special cryptographic algorithm to derive a secret session 
key SK eyA• In the foreign PLMN, the mobile station uses only SKeyA  as 
a secret key. When the mobile station returns to the Home PLMN, it uses 
K ey c as the secret key.
During inter PLMN roaming two extra digits are added to the original 
TMSI and sent to the foreign PLMN along with the normal LAI as the inter 
PLMN location update request. Otherwise the IMSI is sent as a request for 
inter PLMN location update. The proposed security system assumes that 
the two added digits of TMSI show the significants of the Home PLMN of 
the newly entered mobile station to the foreign PLMN. In all other cases the 
ordinary TMSI is sent to identify the mobile station across the GSM PLMN. 
For example, in all other cases ordinary TMSI is sent as a request for location 
update, call request, and paging response of a mobile station within a PLMN. 
The purpose of adding two digits to the normal TMSI is to protect the IMSI 
from exposure during inter PLMN roaming. The VLR or HLR in the foreign
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PLMN can identify the Home PLMN of a newly entered mobile station from 
the added two digits for obtaining the subscriber’s details from its Home 
PLMN.
The key management and the implementation of the encryption algorithm 
in the proposed security system are illustrated in Figure A .l. The AUC 
maintains a subscribers private key table with the private keys of all the 
subscribers in a particular Home PLMN as well as the private session keys 
of all foreign subscribers currently registered to that particular PLMN.
Figure A .l: Key Allocations and Secure Location Update Within PLMN. 
The mobile network components like HLR, VLRs and the GMSCs have a
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private key which is only known to the AUC and the components. Based on 
this, AUC maintains a table called the Intra PLMN key table which contains 
the private key of all components, mainly HLR, VLRs and GMSCs of a Home 
PLMN. These Intra PLMN keys are used to establish a secure location update 
of subscriber data in the fixed infrastructure of a mobile network, when the 
mobile station moves from one VLR area to the other VLR area of a PLMN. 
The use of these keys is explained in section 5 and 7. The AUC maintains 
another table called Inter PLMN key table which contains one to one private 
keys to communicate with the other AUCs in the GSM PLMN. These one 
to one private keys in the Inter PLMN key table are used during the session 
key distribution from Home PLMN to the other PLMN for inter PLMN call 
set up. These keys are also used during the inter PLMN location update for 
transferring subscriber data from one PLMN to another. The utilization of 
these keys is explained in the section 6 and 8.
A .2 Ticket Issuing Protocol
This protocol is employed to secure subscribers data passing between two 
VLRs, when the mobile station moves from one VLR region to another VLR 
region. As can be seen in Fig A .l, Mobile station A moves from VLR2 region 
to the VLR1 region and sends a call request to the VLR1 by sending the old 
TMSI assigned by VLR2. At this point, VLR1 does not have any information 
about A. From the TMSI sent, the VLR1 knows that communicating with 
VLR2 would help in updating subscription details of mobile station A at 
VLR1 from VLR2. It does not know the private key of VLR2. Hence it 
sends a request to the AUC/HLR to update A ’s details from VLR2. The 
protocol is as follows.
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1. VLR1 -> AUC  : V LR l, VLR2
2. AUC  -> VLR1 : A'em [UTA2, T S ,SA S 'S -A V i,^ , TicketLife, Y]
3. UAA1 -»  VLR2 : y  =  A q /v^ U T A l, TS, SESSJ<Vltv2, TicketLife)
In step 1, VLR1 sends a request to the AUC to issue a session key between 
VLR1 and VLR2. In step two, AUC sends a session key SESSJZv i,V2  
which is valid for the time mentioned in the parameter Ticketiife- Y  is sent 
to VLR1 in encrypted form to re-direct it to VLR2, that is why VLR2 is 
included in the encrypted message to VLR1. The timestamp TS' is used to 
protect the message in step 2 from replay attacks.
In step 3, VLR1 decrypts the message from AUC and sends Y  to the 
VLR2. Y  contains a timestamp and a session key SE SS-K v i,V2 which is 
valid up to time Ticket Life- At the end of the protocol VLR1 and VLR2 
have the session key SESS-K v i,V2 - Using the session key SESS-Kv\,V2 -> 
important parameters like encryption key K a and the IMSI of mobile station 
A can be securely transferred between VLR1 and VLR2. The parameter 
VLR1 in Y  tells VLR2 that the key SESS-Ky\,V2 is for communicating 
with VLR1. The Keys K eyv 2 and K eyvi are the private keys of VLR2 
and VLR1 respectively, which are taken from Intra PLMN key table at the 
AUC/HLR.
A .3 Secure Inter PLMN Roaming
This protocol is employed to secure subscribers data passing between 
two PLMNs, when the mobile station moves from one PLMN to another
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Figure A.2: Secure Inter PLMN Location Update
PLMN. As can be seen in Fig A.2, Mobile station A moves from PLMN2 to 
PLMN1 and sends a call request to the PLMN1 by sending the parameter 
ID-TMSI , which is nothing but concatenation of TMSI assigned by the old 
VLR in PLMN2 and the two digit Home PLMN identifier. Upon getting 
ID-TMSI  from mobile A, PLMN1 identifies which PLMN to contact to 
obtain the subscription details for A. The subscription details include IMSI 
of A and secret session key of A to authenticate the newly entered mobile 
station A. To obtain the subscription details, PLMN1 initiates the following 
protocol.
1. A -> A U C  1 :
2. AUC1 - -> AUC2
3. AUC2 - -> AUCl
4. AUC 1 - -> A :
CalLReq, ID_TMS 1(A)
I<AUT1ì2[AUC1, Loc-Up-Req, ID-TM SI{A),TS] 
I<AUTh2[AUC2,TS + l,SKeyAiIMSI{A)\ 
Authenticatiori-For-M obile(A)JJ singS K ei/A
In step 2, PLMN1 gets one to one private key of PLMN2 to PLMN1 from
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its inter PLMN key table, KAUTi,2, and encrypts a location update request 
for mobile station A along with IDTTM SI(A), TS and sends it to PLMN2. 
The key I<AUTli2 proves the identity of PLMNl and the timestamp TS is 
used to prevent replay attacks. The AUCl shows the originator of message in 
step 2. Upon getting the message in step 2 at AUC2, PLMN2 gets the IMSI 
of A that corresponds to TMSI(A). It also calculates a secret session key for 
A, which can be derived from a special cryptographic algorithm using the 
actual secret key of A. Then PLMN2 sends the response to PLMNl, which 
is illustrated in step 3 of the above protocol.
In step 3, K AU Ti ' 2 is a one to one private key of PLMN2 to PLMNl 
which is taken from inter PLMN Key table of PLMN2. The Timestamp +  1 
is the proof for correct reply from PLMN2. A ’s subscribers data SI<eyA and 
IM S  1(A) are used to identify and authenticate the newly entered mobile 
station A in the PLMNl. The AUC2 shows the originator of the message 
in step 3. During this time, the mobile station A derives the secret session 
S K eyA at its end to prepare for the authentication check. Once the A ’s 
subscriber data has safely reached, PLMNl initiates the authentication and 
session key distribution for A.
This protocol prevents A ’s IMSI being exposed in step 1 likewise, in 
existing security system for GSM and securely transfer A ’s subscriber data 
across the border between two PLMNs.
A .4 Authenticated Session Key Distribution
Protocol
The protocols we have seen so far are used to secure the subscriber data 
(non-voice data) across the fixed infrastructure of a GSM PLMN. However
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Figure A .3: Authenticated Session Key Distribution
this key distribution protocol is for encrypting a user’s voice data at both 
the air interface and the fixed infrastructure of a GSM PLMN.
The authenticated key distribution protocol for voice encryption is illus­
trated in Figure A .3. In the proposed security system, one protocol estab­
lishes a mutual authentication between the network and the mobile station 
as well as the distribution of session key to the mobile stations for call en­
cryption. In Figure A .3 mobile station A initialize a call to mobile station B 
in the same PLMN. The protocol for authentication, session key distribution 
and point to point encryption between A and B is as follows.
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1. A  -> AUC  : CalLReq, T M S I(A ), RA
2. AUC -»> A : KeyA[HPLM N , Ra , S E SS J{a ,b , R h p l m n ]
3. A —>AUC : K eya [TMS 1(A), R h p l m n , IS D N (B )]
4. AUC -> B  : P a g e - R e q ,  R I h p l m
5. B  -> AUC  : KeyB[PageRes,TM SI(B), R l h p l m n , R b \
6. AUC  -> B  : KeyA[HPLM N, Rb , S E S S J(a,b ], StartCinhering
6. AUC -> A : StartC inhering
Mobile station A initiates a call, which is shown in step 1. In this step 
TMSI(A) is the identity of A in PLMN and Ra is a random number to 
authenticate the network. Upon getting this at the AUC, step 2 of the 
protocol is initiated. In step 2, K ey a and Ra are used to verify the identity 
of the network and the Ra is also used to prove that the message is a fresh 
reply from the network. The Rhplmn in step two is used to authenticate 
the mobile station A by the network. The H P L M N  shows the originator of 
the message. At this point network believes that the request is genuine and 
then sends a session key SESSJKa,b to A. If the request is from an attacker, 
then at this point it is impossible for an attacker to decrypt the session key.
Once A gets the message in step 2, it initiates step 3. In step 3 of 
the protocol, K ey a and the Rhplmn are used to verify the authenticity of 
the mobile station by the network. The TMSI(A) shows the originator of 
the message. Only in step 3 the mobile station A sends the ISDN of B 
(telephone number of B), because this should not be exposed for security 
reasons. Basically step 3 is the call set-up from mobile A.
Once AUC gets the message in step 3, it sends a page request to the 
mobile station B for setting up an incoming call for B. This is shown in step 
4, RIhplm is f°r B authenticating the network. Upon getting this B initiates
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step 5, which is a page response from B. In step 5, K eys  and the Rhplmn 
are used to prove the authenticity of B. TM S 1(B) shows the originator of the 
message and the parameter Rb is to verify the authenticity of the network 
by B. At the end of the step 5, the AUC verifies the authenticity of B, 
then initiates step 6 for both A and B. Step 6 for B contains the session key 
SE SS-K a ,b for voice encryption , and Rb and K ey a which are used to verify 
the identity of the AUC by B and H P L M N  which shows the originator of the 
message. After B decrypts the message in step 6, it takes the SE SS-K a,b 
and inputs to the fenced DES encryption algorithm to start enciphering. 
A also does the same thing after it gets the start ciphering message from 
the AUC. This makes sure that the whole call is encrypted both at the air 
interface and the fixed infra-structure of the GSM PLMN from mobile A to 
Mobile B.
A .5 Inter PLMN Calls
The authenticated key distribution protocol for the inter PLMN call is quite 
similar to the key distribution protocol for calls within a PLMN. Since the 
inter PLMN call goes outside of the Home PLMN and get connected to 
another PLMN, session keys will be distributed to the GMSC and the mobile 
station. Even if the call is from the mobile station to the fixed telephone, the 
session keys are distributed to the GMSC and the mobile station, so that the 
call is encrypted between the GMSC and the mobile station. The call may 
be encrypted from the GMSC to the fixed telephone. However this depends 
on the security system used by the fixed telephone system. Here we have 
considered only the security of the inter PLMN mobile calls.
The Inter PLMN call is illustrated in Fig A.4 where mobile station A in
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PLMN 2 PLMN 1
Border
Figure A.4: Inter PLMN calls
PLMN 1 initiates a call to mobile station B in PLMN 2. In this case, firstly 
mutual authentication between A and PLMN1 takes place and secondly, 
mutual authentication between B and the PLMN2 takes place. At the end 
of both the authentication processes, one session key KeyA,G2 is distributed 
to A and the GMSC2 by PLMN1 to encrypt the call between A and GMSC2 
and another session key KeyB,G2 is distributed to B and the GMSC2 by 
the PLMN2 to encrypt the call between B and GMSC2. Finally the call 
is encrypted from one point of A to the other point of B. This protocol is 
explained below.
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1. A AUC  1 : CalLReq, T M S I(A ), RA
2. AUC  1 —> A : K eyA[HPLM N, Ra ,S E S S .K a ,G2,R HPLMn ]
3. A  -> AU C l : K eyA[TM SI(A), Rhplmn, ISD N (B )}
4. AUC  1 AUC2 : I<AUCia [AUCl, IS D N (B ),T S , SESSJKA,G2
GM SCPlmn2]
5. AUC2 B  : PageJleq, R Ihplm
6. B  -> AUC2 : KeyB[Page-Res,TM SI(B), R Ihplm n , Rb ]
7. AUC2 -> AUC 1 : KAUC\t2[AUC2,TS  +  1], StartCiphering
7. AUC2 GMSC2 : SE SSJ{AU2 ,G2 {SESSJ<eyAG2,
SESSJ<b ,g2,TS], S-C
7. AUC2 -> B  : K eys[H P LM N , Rb ,SESSJ<b ,G2\,S-C
7. AUC1 -> A : StartCiphering(S-C)
In step 1 of the protocol, Rji is used to authenticate the PLMN1 by A.
T M S I(A ) is used to identify A in the network. Once AUC gets the message 
in step 1, it initiates step 2. In step 2, K ey a and the Ra are used by A to 
verify the authenticity of PLMN1. SESSJ<a,G2 is used for enciphering voice 
data once the protocol is over, by getting the start enciphering message from 
the PLMN1. Rhplmn is used by PLMN1 to authenticate the mobile station 
A. At the end of step 2, A verifies the identity of PLMN1. On response, A 
initiates step 3 of the protocol. Once PLMN1 gets the message in step 3, it 
verifies the authenticity of A by checking K ey a and the Rhplmn in step 3. 
Now PLMN1 has the ISND of B. It recognizes that B belongs to PLMN2 by 
looking at the ISND of B. To initiate the paging request for B as well as the 
session key distribution to GMSC2, PLMN1 takes the one to one private key 
PLMN1 to PLMN1 from its inter PLMN key table and initiates step 4 of the 
protocol. In step 4, TS proves that the message is fresh and originated from
AUC1.
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Once the PLMN2 gets the message in step 4, it initiates a paging request 
for B which is shown in step 5. RIhplm is for PLMN2 authenticating B. 
Upon getting this, B initiates step 6, which is a page response from B. In step 
6, K eys  and RIhplmn are used to prove the authenticity of B. T M S I(B ) 
shows the originator of the message and the parameter Rb that is used to 
verify the authenticity of PLMN2 by B. At the end of step 6 PLMN2 verifies 
the authenticity of B, then initiates step 7 for B, GMSC2 and PLMN1. Step 
7 for B contains the session key SESS-K b ,G2 for voice encryption ,Rb and 
K e y s , which are used to verify the identity of PLMN2 by B and H PLM N 2  
which shows the originator of the message. After B decrypts the message 
in step 7, it takes SESS-K b ,G2 and inputs to the fenced DES encryption 
algorithm to start enciphering. Step 7 for GMSC2 contains S E S S J{b ,G2 and 
SE SS-K a,G2 i which are encrypted using the key SESS-K aU2 ,G2 • The key 
SESSJ<Au2 ,G2 is assumed to have been established for a particular life time 
Ticket Life by the AUC2 to the GMSC2 for secure subscriber transfer between 
AUC2 and GMSC2, which is similar as the protocol secure location update 
discussed in section 5. Session keys S E S S J{b ,G2 and the SESS-K A,G2 in 
step 7 for GMSC2 are used to encrypt/decrypt calls from/to mobile station 
A and B. In step 7 for PLMN1 from PLMN2, TS + 1 and K A U C i,2 shows the 
fresh and correct reply from PLMN2. Once PLMN1 gets the proper reply 
from PLMN2 it sends a start enciphering message to A. After this the whole 




This section is meant to give the reader a quick look up table containing 
the abbreviations used in this thesis together with a brief explanation. For 
a more elaborate description and the precise definition of all the terms used 
refer [9].
Subscriber: Subscriber refers to the holder of the account for a service, which may 
or may not be the same person as the user of the mobile equipment. 
For example, a subscriber can bar outgoing calls which a user cannot 
override.
GSM: Global system for mobile communications (GSM) is a global networking 
system for mobile communications like cellular mobile phones. The 
GSM land mobile network (GSM PLMN) is globalised and formed by 
integrating different country’s public land mobile network (PLMN). 
The public land mobile network (PLMN) is an independent mobile 
network within the GSM PLMN. Home PLMN refers to mobile station 
in its own PLMN. The visited PLMN refers to a mobile station in the 
other PLMN, but within the GSM PLMN.
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KAUC\,2 • One to one, Inter PLMN private keys. These keys are stored in the 
Inter PLMN key table of AUC of a PLMN. For Example: The key 
K A U C i,2 is used between the AUCs of PLMN1 and PLMN2.
K ey a . K ey h i- The private key of Mobile station A and HLR respectively. The K ey a 
is stored in the SIM of a mobile station A and in the Subscribers key 
table of AUC. The Keyni^Keyvi^Keyoi are stored in a secure place 
at the respective network components and in Intra PLMN key table of 
AUC of PLMN.
SESS-K a,b '- Session key for mobile stations which is used to encipher voice data.
This key is encrypted using respective private key of mobile station and 
sent to the mobile stations from the AUC.
SKeyA : Secret Session key for mobile stations which is used instead! of pri­
vate key at the foreign PLMN. This key is generated for particular 
subscription only at the AUC of HPLMN and the SIM.
( SESS-K v i,V2 ‘ Session key for mobile network components which is used to encipher
subscriber data at the fixed infra-structure of a PLMN. This key is 
encrypted using respective private key of mobile network components 
and sent to the mobile network components from the AUC.
Inter PLMN Key Table: This table resides only in the AUC of a PLMN, Which contains the
one to one inter PLMN private keys.
Intra PLMN Key Table: This table resides only in the AUC of a PLMN, Which contains the
private keys of all mobile network components of a PLMN.
IMSI: The International mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) uniquely identifies 
each and every subscriber on GSM PLMN. Each subscription is referred 
in the GSM PLMN, only with the help of IMSI. This is different from 
a subscribers mobile telephone number.
I l l
LAI: Location area identification (LAI) is the information indicating the 
location where the mobile station was last registered. It is stored in the 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) along with the Temporary Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (TMSI).
ME: Mobile equipment (ME) consists of a device which has the ability to 
communicate with the mobile network, but it does not hold any sub­
scriber related information. The Mobile Station (MS) without the valid 
SIM is ME.
MS: Mobile station (MS) is a piece of mobile equipment with a valid sub­
scriber identity module (SIM) inserted. This equipment cannot make or 
receive calls independently, since no subscription information is avail­
able in it. The insertion of a valid SIM into it, makes mobile station 
access to the mobile network possible.
SIM: Subscriber identity module (SIM) is a smart card which holds all the 
information required to identify a particular subscription to a mobile 
service. The subscriber’s card provides security and other subscription 
as well as network related information.
TMSI: Temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI) is the temporary identi­
fication given to the mobile station, while it is in the service area of a 
particular visitor location register (MSC/VLR). It has local significance 
and so is normally used in conjunction with an location area identity 
for identification purposes. Temporary mobile subscriber identity is­
sued by VLR, proves the subscriber identity confidentiality.
A3: Algorithm 3, authentication algorithm used for authenticating the sub­
scriber.
A5: Algorithm 5, cipher algorithm, used for enciphering/deciphering data.
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A8: Algorithm 8, cipher key generator, used to generate K c
AUC: Authentication center, used to store the keys / i c, A3, A8, DES in 
CFB mode, Intra PLMN key table and Inter PLMN key table are 
implemented in the AUC.
HLR: Home location register, a register in the Home PLMN of the subscriber 
where (all) information related to the location and the subscription are 
permanently stored.
Home PLMN: Home PLMN, the network with which a subscriber is generated.
K c: the cipher key, used in DES and A5 to generate the key stream in the 
proposed security system and the existing security system respectively.
K i‘. the subscriber authentication key, used in A3 and A8.
PLMN: Public land mobile network, a network providing communication pos­
sibilities for mobile users.
R, RAND: a non predictable number, used as a challenge in the authentication 
process.
SRES: Signed Response, used by the network side to verify the identity of the 
SIM in the authentication process.
VLR: Visitor location register register, the register where the user is tem­
porarily registered while in a location controlled by this register.
Gateway MSC: Gateway mobile switching center, used to switch the call to the different 
networks.
MSC: Mobile services switching center, used to switch the call to different 
points in the network.
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BSS: Base station, used to provide radio link between MS and PLMN.
IV: Initialisation Vector used as an initial input to the DES in both OFB 
mode and CFB mode.
AUC/HLR: is the AUC situated closer to the HLR of the Home PLMN. The AUC 
and HLR combined to gather Governs the secure mobile communica­
tions. The inter PLMN key table and Intra PLMN key table of HLR 





During the course of this project a lot of activity was undertaken which had 
an indirect bearing on the successful completion of this project. One of the 
important aspect was developing a program that would enable to perform 
encryption/decryption of voice data ( audio file) using DES in OFB mode and 
also to perform encryption/decryption of authentication protocol discussed 
in chapter 6 using DES in CFB mode.
The program mobile.c initially takes three inputs, private key, initial­
ization vector (IV) and an option. The key input and IV can be given 8 
character or 16 hexadecimal digits. The option is used to choose authentica­
tion, enciphering/deciphering subscriber data and encryption/decryption of 
the voice data.
In the authentication option, it generates 64 bit random number by asking 
the seed from the user. It uses the generated random number as IV and the 
key input from the user as a private key to encrypt the identification code
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file “inp.txt” using DES in CFB mode. Before that, it verifies from the user 
that, whether the identification code is entered in the “inp.txt” file or not.
The encrypted identification code (ID) is appended to the file “temp.txt” . 
The content of “temp.txt” before appending the encrypted ID code, is the 
Req and the generated 64 bit random number. This input is expected to enter 
in the file “temp.txt” along with the entering of ID code in the file “inp.txt” . 
Then the appended file “temp.txt” is encrypted using DES in CFB with the 
same key and user IV input as the initial input. The encrypted output text 
is in the file “out.txt” .
In the decryption of authentication protocol, the first decryption is carried 
out with the decryption of “out.txt” using the same key and the same IV 
entered by the user. It produces “temp.text” after first decryption. This file 
contains the encrypted ID code, Req and the 64 bit random IV. To decrypt 
the encrypted ID code, the second decryption is carried with 64 bit random 
number as IV which is taken from “temp.text” and the same user entered 
private key as a key to decode the encrypted ID code using DES in CFB 
mode. It produces the output decrypted ID code in the file “inp.txt” from 
the “temp.txt” . we can compare whether the decrypted ID code is same as 
the ID code code entered during encryption of authentication protocol. If 
the ID code is same as one entered during encryption of authentication, we 
can confirm that the Req and the sender is valid.
In the voice encryption option, apart from the key and the IV input from 
the user, it asks the input audio file and the output file from the user. The 
audio input to the input file can be given through audiotool software. It 
encrypts the audio input file using DES in OFB mode. This option only 
takes audio file as input, for all other type of input file, it informs the user 
that it is not an audio file and quits. The encrypted output file can be passed
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to the speaker output using the command “cat < filenam e »  /dev/audio” . 
The decryption of the encrypted voice data is vice versa of the encryption 
method.
We have one more option on encryption/decryption of text file using 
DES in CFB mode. This is similar to the voice encryption option, but it 
takes the text file as the input file and encrypts using CFB mode. This is 
employed for sending enciphered subscribers data (non voice data) like IMSI 
and triplet, between network components. The main reason for employing 
DES in CFB for text file encryption is to prove the message integrity. But 
checking message integrity is not employed in this programs.
A
* mobile, c - program for Authentication and file encryption/decryption
* using DES.
*
* This program reads options from the user, and performs
* authentication and encryption/decryption using the DES
* Data Encryption Algorithm. The program uses DES in Cipher feed back
* mode (CFB) to encrypt/decrypt authentication protocol and sending
* subscriber’s data and traffic data between mobile network compnents.
* In CFB mode, the plaintext input is X O R ’d with the ciphertext output
* from the previous byte stream. Thus each byte stream depends on all
* previous block. Authentication is achieved by double
* encryption/decryption.
*'
* For encrypting/decrypting voice data this program uses DES in
* Output Feed Back mode. In OFB mode, the voice data input is X O R ’d
* with the keystream output. Thus each enciphered byte stream does not
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* depend on all previous stream. The voice data can be loaded the input
* file using audiotool. The DES encryption/decryption is
* performed by calling DES library routines.
*
* /
#include < s td io .h >
#include < s tr in g s .h >
#include ”mobile_des .h” /*include DES Interface Specification headers * /  
#include ” mobile_mode .h”
#include ” m obile_des64. c ”
A
* main() - main routine
* scans option, private key and initialisation vector and then





* Define global data structures used by main routines
* /
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char * key [16], *in_vector[16], *iv_code[16], yes, in_file[7]; 
char out Jile[7];
unsigned long x2, y2, SEED, a[2], d[2], e[2]; 







scanf("'/,d",&option); /*  scans option */
printf(" Enter the private key in 16 hex or 8 char\n\n"); 
scanf("\t'/,s", key); /*  scans private key */
printf(" Enter the in itia l vector in 16 hex or 8 char\n\n"); 
scanf("\t'/,s",in_vector); /* scans IV * /
if (strlen(key) = =  16) /*  check ascii or hex key */
hexkey =  1;
if (strlen(in_vector) = =  16) /*  check ascii or hex IV  */
hexiv = 1 ;
A
* convert key from acsii/hex to 64-bit number, and set it
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* similarly for IV  value if specified
* /
if (hexkey) /*  convert key from ascii to long * /
gethexJkey_or_iv(key, (char *)a ); / *  specified in hex */
else
getkey.or Jv(key, (char *)a ); / *  specified in ascii */
desinit(O); /*  do library initialization */




printf("\n\n ENCRYPTING AUTHENTICATION PR0T0C0L\n\n\n");
printf(" E nter th e  seed f o r  64 b i t  RAND\n"); 
printf(" RAND i s  used in  a u t h e n t i c a t i o n ^ ") ;  
printf(" Seed can be 1 to  99999\n\n\n"); 
scanf("\t'/.d", &SEED); /*  scans the seed to * /
/*generate random number * /  
x2 =  tempa(SEED); 
y2 =  tempo(SEED);
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e[0] =  x2; /*  loading 32 bit rand number as */
/*IV ’s first part */ 
e[l] =  y2; / *  loading 32 bit rand number as */
/*IV ’s second part */
printf("\n\n\t\tRAND =  */,x#/,x\n\n\ii", e[0], e[l]); 
printf("Opeii i n p .t x t  and lo a d  ID o f  PLMN,\n"); 
p r in tf("fo r  i n i t i a t i n g  a u th e n tic a tio n  p ro to c o l\ n \ n "); 
printf("Open t e m p .t x t ,  lo a d  Req & 64 b i t  RAND\n\n\nu); 
p r in t f( "I f  lo a d ed  ty p e  }y} o th erw ise  ty p e  \n\n\nu); 
s c a n f("\ t#/ , s " ,  &yes); 
i f  (yes = =  ’y ’ ) {
setIV((char *)e); /*  specify rand number */
/* to use as IV  for first encryption*/
/* opens input file to be enrypted*/ 
i f  ((filein =  fopen("inp.tx t" , " r " ))  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input f i le l .\ n " ) ;  
setbuf(filein, (char *)NULL);
/*  opens output file to be stored */
/* enciphered data*/
i f  ((filetemp =  fopen("temp.tx t" , "a")) = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open output f i le l\ n " ) ; 
setbuf(filetemp, (char *)NULL);
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/*  first encryption in CFB mode*/
do_encfb 1 (filein ,filetemp);
p rin tf("\ t F i r s t  e n c ry p tio n  i s  o v e r\ n ");
p rin tf("\ t INPUT FILE =  ' inp . t x t ' \ n ");
printf ( "  \ tOUTPUT FILE =  Hemp . t x t ' \n\n\n\n");
fclose(filein); 
fclose(filetem p);
p rintf("\n\n\t Encrypted ID code Appened to  th e  Req 
k RAND IV can be seen  in  Widow b\n\n\n");
sy stem ("b  temp . t x t ” ) ;
desinit(O);
keyinit((char *)a ); / *  specify same key to use */
/*for second encryption*/
if (hexiv) {
gethex_key_orJv(in_vector, (char *)d );
}
else  {
getkey_or_iv(in_vector, (char *)d );
}
set I V (  (char * )d ); /*  specify user defined IV  */
/*to use in second encryption */ 
if  ((filetemp =  fopen("temp .tx t " , " r " ))  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input file2 \ n ");
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setbuf(filetemp, (char *)NULL);
/*  opening input and output file for 2nd encryption*/ 
i f  ((fileout =  fop en ("ou t . t x t " ,  "w "))  = =  NULL) 
printf(" can t open output f i l e 2 \ n " ) ;  
setbuf(fileout, (char *)NULL);
/*  second encryption in CFB mode */ 
do _encfbl (filetemp, fileout);
p rintf("\n\n\t Second en c ry p tio n  i s  over\nn); 
p rin tf("\ t INPUT FILE= ' t e m p .t x t '\ n " ) ;  
p rin tf("\ t OUTPUT FILE =  ' o u t . t x t J \n\n\n\n"); 
f close (fileout); 
fclose (filetemp);
printf("\n\n E ncrypting m essage in  tem p. t x t \ n ") ;  
p rin tf("\ t en cryp ted  m essage in  out .tx t\ n \ n \ n "); 
printf("\n\n\t Encrypted ID co d e , Req & RAND IV can 
be seen  in  window b \n\n\n");
sy stem ("b  o u t . t x t " ) ;  
b re a k ;
}
b re a k ;
case  2 :
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printf("\n\n DECRYPTING AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL\n\n\n");
if  (hexiv) /*  specify used entered IV  to use */
/*for first decyption*/ 
gethex_key_orJv(in_vector, (char *)d);
else
getkey_or Jv(in_vector, (char *)d); 
setIV((char *)d);
/*  opens input and output file for first decryption*/ 
i f  ((fileout =  fo p en ("o u t . t x t " ,  " r " ) )  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open output f i l e l \ n " ) ;
if  ((filetemp =  fopen("tem p.txt", "w")) = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input f i le l\ n ") ; 
setbuf(filetemp, (char *)NULL);




printf("\n\n F i r s t  d ecry p tio n  i s  o v er\ n "); 
p rin tf("\n \t INPUT FILE =  * o u t . t x t ' \ n ");
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p rin tf("\ t OUTPUT FILE =  'tem p . t x t  '\n\n\n\ii"); 
printf("\n\n\t D ecrypted ID co d e , Req & RAND IV can be 
seen in  window b \n\n\n");
system ("b  t e m p .t x t " ) ;  
desinit(O);
keyinit((char *)a ); / *  specify same key to use for second */
/* decryption*/
printf(" open te m p .tx t  f i l e  and load  th e  RAND\n"); 
printf(" as i n i t i a l  input to  d ecrypt ID code\n"); 
printf(" to  check th e  a u th en tic ity \ n \ n \ n ");
printf("\n Or E nter decryp ted  RAND from window b \n "); 
printf(" as IV to  d ecryp t ID code o f sender\n\n\n"); 
scanf("% s",iv_code); / *  scans the IV  for second decryption */ 
if  (strlen(iv_code) = =  16) 
hexivcode =  1; 




getkey_or Jv(iv_code, (char *)e);
}
se tIV ((ch a r  *)e);
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/ *  opens input and output file for second decryption*/ 
if  ((filetemp =  fopen("tem p.txt", " r " ))  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open output file2\ n ");
setbuf(filetemp, (char *)NULL);
if  ((filein_out =  fopen("inp_out .tx t " , "w")) = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input file2\ n "); 
setbuf(filein_out, (char *)NULL);
keyinit((char *)a ); / *  specify same key to use for */
/*second decryption*/
/* second encryption in CFB mode */ 
do_ddecfb 1 (filetemp ,filein_out); 
fclose(filetemp); 
fclose(filein_out);
p rintf("\n\n\t Second d ecry p tio n  i s  o v er\ n "); 
printf("\nINPUT FILE =  Hemp . t x t 1 \n "); 
p rin tf("\ t OUTPUT FILE =  ' inp_out . t x t J \n\n\n\n"); 
printf(" Check th e  d ecryp ted  id e n t i f i c a t i o n  code (ID )
\n");
printf(" in  window b i s  same as th e ID code en tered  in  
th e  f i l e  in p . tx t\ n \ n \ n \ n ");
sy stem ("b  in p _ o u t .t x t " ) ;
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break;
ca se  3 :
printf(" ENCRYPTION OF SUBSCRIBER'S DATA (NON 
VOICE) \ n ") ;
printf("\n\n e n te r  input f i l e  f o r  s u b s c r ib e r 's  d ata\n M); 
sca n f("#/ . s " ,  &;in_file); /* scans input file */
if  ((filein =  fopen(in_file, "r " )) = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input f i l e 3 \ n " ) ;  
setbuf(filein, (ch ar *)NULL);
printf("\n\n P le a se  e n te r  th e  output f i le \ n \ n ") ;  
sc a n f("#/ . s " ,  &out_file); / *  scans output file*/
if ((fileout =  fopen(out_file, "w")) = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input f i l e 3 \ n " ) ;  
setbuf (fileout, (ch ar *)NULL);
if  (hexiv)
gethex_key_or_iv(in_vector, (char *)d );
e lse
getkey_or_iv(in_vector, (char *)d ); 
setIV ((ch a r * )d ); / *  specify entered IV  to use* /
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printf(" DECRYPTION OF SUBSCRIBER'S DATA\n");
printf("\n\n enter input f i l e  to  be decrypted\n"); 
scanf("#/,s ,,, &in_file); /*  scan input file to decrypt*/
if ((filein =  fopen(inJile, " r " ))  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input file4\ n "); 
setbuf(filein, (char *)NULL);
printf("\n\n Please enter the output f i l e  \n\n"); 
scanf("y.s", &out_file); /*  scans output file */
if  ((fileout =  fopen(outJile, "w")) = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input file4\ n "); 
setbuf (fileout, (char *)NULL);
if (hexiv)
gethex_key_or Jv(in_vector, (char *)d);
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else
getkey_orJv(in_vector, (char *)d); 
setIV((char *)d); /*  specify entered IV  to use*/






printf(" ENCRYPTION OF THE VOICE DATA \ n ");
printf("\n\n e n te r  input f i l e  f o r  v o ic e  d ata\n \n ");
scanf(n*/.sM, &in_file); /*  scan input voice file to encrypt */
if ((filein =  fopen(in_file, " r " ) )  = =  NULL)
printf(" cant open input f i l e 5 l \ n " ) ;
if((m  =  fgetc(filein)) ^  ’ .’ ) {






p rin tf("\n \n \t O r ig in a l  V o ice  B efo re  E ncryption  Can Be 
L is te n  Now\n\n\n");
system("cat voice.au >/dev/audio"); 
if ((filein =  fopen(in_file, " r " ) )  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input file5\n");
setbuf(iilein, (char *)NULL);
printf("\n\n P le a s e  e n te r  th e  output f i le \ n \ n ") ;  
scanf(,,#/ , s " ,  &;out_file); / *  scans output file */
if  ((fileout =  fopen(out Jile, "w")) = =  NULL) 
p rintf(" can t open input f i l e 5 \ n " ) ;  
setbuf(fileout, (ch a r *)NULL);
if (hexiv)
gethex_key_or Jv(in_vector, (char *)d);
else
getkey_or_iv(in_vector, (char *)d); 
setIV((char *)d); /*specify entered IV  to use*/
/*  voice encryption in OFB mode */ 
do_ofb8 (filein, fileout); 
fclose(filein); 
fclose (fileout);
prin tf("\n \n \t E ncrypted  V o ice  Caii Be L is te n
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Now\n\n\n");
s y s te m ("c a t  e n c ry p te d _v o ic e .a u  > /d e v /a u d i o " ) ;  
b re a k ;
case 6 :
printf(" DECRYPTION OF THE VOICE DATA\nn);
printf("\n\n enter input f i l e  to  be decrypted\n\n\n"); 
scanf("#/.s", &;in_file); /* scan encrypted voice input file */
if  ((filein =  fopen(in_file, " r " ))  = =  NULL) 
printf(" cant open input file6 \ n "); 
setbuf(filein, (char *)NULL);
printf("\n\n P le a s e  e n te r  th e  output f i le \ n \ n ") ;  
sc a n f("#/ . s " ,  &out_iile); /* scans output file */
if  ((fileout =  fopen(out_file, "w")) = =  NULL) 
printf(" ca n t open input f i l e 6 \ n " ) ;  
setbuf(fileout, (char *)NULL);
if  (hexiv)
gethex_key_or Jv(in_vector, (char *)d);
else
getkey.or Jv(in_vector, (char *)d); 
setIV((char *)d); A  specify entered IV  to use*/
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/*  voice decryption in OFB mode */ 
do_ofb8 (filein ,iileout); 
fclose(filein); 
fclose(fileout);
printf("\n\n\t D ecrypted  V o ice  Can Be L is te n  
Now\n\n\n");
sy ste m ("c a t  d e c ry p te d _v o ic e .a u  > /d e v /a u d i o " ) ;  
b re a k ;
case 7 :
printf(" YOU ARE QUITING\nu); 
printf(" \n");
b re a k ; A  Quit mode * /




* gethex.key.or.i(kin, k) and getkey~or-iv((kin, k) convent the
* string supplied for
* the key into a 64-bit block, assuming the string is hex chars,
* or standard 7-bit ascii chars respectively, getkey will





ch ar *kin; 
char k[8] ;
{
in t i,t[8] ;
/*  input string supplied for key */
/*  output 64-bit key value */
i f  ((strlen(kin) ^  16) || /*  check for valid length key * /
(sscanf(kin, " 4/,2x'/,2x*/.2x'/,2x#/,2xy,2x*/,2x7,2x",
&t[0],&t[l],&t[2],<^;t[3],&:t[4],&:t[5],&t[6],&t[7]) ^  8)) { 











in t i, j, p;
/*  input string supplied for key * /
/*  output 64-bit key value */
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i f  (strlen(kin) < 8) {  /*  check for valid length key * /
printf(,,#/0s : Bad key or IV s p e c i f ic a t io n \ n ") ;  
e x it(-l) ;
}
/*  Calculate parity bit for each key byte */ 
fo r  ( i= 0 ; i< 8 ; i + + )  { /*  for each key char * /
k[i] =  kin[i]; /*  copy it into 64-bit block */
fo r  (p—0, j —0; j<7; j+ + ) /*  calculate parity & set it */
i f  ( k[i] & (1 «  j)) /*  count number of 1 ’s V
p + + ;
if  ((p k  1) = =  0) /* if even V
k[i] |= 0x80; /*  set parity bit V
else /* otherwise * /




* do.encfblQ  - the main encryption routine for the CFB (Cipher
* Feedback stream mode) with k= 8 feedback. This routine reads
* 1 byte blocks of input, XO R ’s with the output formed by
* encrypting the chain vector, writes that byte out, and forms







register int c; /*  current character read in last read */
while ((c =  fgetc(in)) ^  EOF) {
en_cfbl(c); /*  en/decrypt char c in 8-bit CFB mode */




* do-decfbl() - the main decryption routine for the CFB (Cipher
* Feedback stream mode) with k= 8 feedback. This routine reads
* 1 byte blocks o f input, XO R ’s with the output formed by
* encrypting the chain vector, writes that byte out, and forms






register int c; /*  current character read in last read */
while ((c =  fgetc(in)) ^  EOF) {
de_cfbl(c); /*  en/decrypt char c in 8-bit CFB mode















main encryption/decryption routine for the OFB (Output
Feedback stream mode) with k=64 feedback. This routine reads 
8 byte blocks o f input, XOR ;s with the output formed by 
encrypting the chain vector, and writes that block out.
The new chain vector is the endes output.
{
int cnt =  0; /*  count of characters read in last read
Long work[2]; 6f-bit work value used by F)ES routines
do { /*  read next 8 byte block
cnt =  fread((char *)work, 1, 8, in); 
en_ofb8(work);
fw rite((char *)work, 1, cnt, out); /*  write ciphertext */
}  w h ile  (cnt = =  8);
}
/*  loop back until last block has been read */
/* procedure for main-menu which is used to select perticular task * /
main_menu()
{
printf(" \ n ") ;  
printf(" \ n ") ;
printf(" CRYPTO MENU \ n "); 
printf(" \ n ") ;
p rin tf("-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\ n ");
printf(" \ n ") ; 
printf(" \ n ") ;
p r in tf("l  : ENCRYPTING AUTHENTICATION PR0T0C0L\n"); 
printf(" IN CFB M0DE\nM); 
printf(" \ n ") ;
p rintf("2  : DECRYPTING AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL\n"); 
printf(" IN CFB M0DE\n"); 
printf(" \ n ") ;
p rin tf("3  : ENCRYPTING SUBSCRIBER'S DATA IN CFB M0DE\n"); 
printf(" \ n ") ;
p rin tf("4  : DECRYPTING SUBSCRIBER'S DATA IN CFB M0DE\nu);
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p rintf(" \ n ") ;
p rin tf("5  : ENCRYPTION OF THE VOICE IN OFB MODE \ n "); 
p rintf(" \ n ") ;
p rin tf("6  : DECRYPTION OF THE VOICE IN OFB MODE \ n "); 
p rintf(" \ n ") ;
p rin tf("7  : QUIT AND GO TO $ PROMPT \ n "); 
printf(" \ n ") ; 
printf(" \ n ") ; 
p rintf(" \n\n\n");
printf(" P le a s e  e n te r  your o p tio n  \n\n\n");
/*  '
* do.ddecfblQ - the main decryption routine for the CFB (Cipher
* Feedback stream mode) with k= 8 feedback. Skips first line and reads
* 1 byte blocks of input from second line, XOR’s with the output formed by
* encrypting the chain vector, writes that byte out, and forms







register int c; 
char buff[80];
/*  current character read in last read */
fgets(buff, 80, in);
while ((c =  fgetc(in)) ^  EOF) {
v
* /
de_cfbl(c); /*  en/decrypt char c in 8-bit CFB mode
fputc(c, out); /*  and write result to output
}
}
/*  tempa(q) - is used to generate 32 bit random number which is used as 





x =  srand(q); 




/ *  tempo (q) - is used to generate 32 bit random number which is used as





q =  q +  8; 
x =  srand(q); 
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